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ABSTRACT 
This Article outlines a blockchain based system to solve the orphan works 
problem.  Orphan works are works still ostensibly protected by copyright for which 
an author cannot be found.  Orphan works represent a significant problem for the 
efficient dissemination of knowledge, since users cannot license the works, and as a 
result may choose not to use them.  Our proposal uses a blockchain to register 
attempts to find the authors of orphan works, and otherwise to facilitate use of those 
works.  
There are three elements to our proposal.  First, we propose a number of 
mechanisms, included automated systems, to perform a diligent search for a rights 
holder.  Second, we propose a blockchain register where every search for a work’s 
owner can be recorded.  Third, we propose a legal mechanism that delivers works 
into orphanhood, and affords a right to use those works after a search for a rights 
holder is deemed diligent.  These changes would provide any user of an orphan work 
with an assurance that they were acting legally as long as they had consulted the 
register and/or performed a diligent search for the work’s owner. 
The Article demonstrates a range of complementary legal and technological 
architectures that, in various formations, can be deployed to address the orphan 
works problem.  We show that these technological systems are useful for 
enhancement of the public domain more generally, through the existence of a 
growing registry of gray status works and clarified conditions for their use.  The 
selection and design of any particular implementation is a choice for policy makers 
and technologists.  Rather than specify how that choice should look, the goal here is 
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to demonstrate the utility of the technology and to clarify and promote its role in 
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Orphan works are works which are still ostensibly protected by copyright, but for 
which a rightsholder cannot be found.  They represent a significant problem for the 
efficient dissemination of knowledge, since potential users of the works cannot 
license their use, and as a result may choose not to use them for fear of a possible 
infringement action if the owner does subsequently emerge.  This has the potential 
to ‘lock up’ cultural material on one hand, while encouraging wide-spread 
infringement on the other.  Orphan works also represent a challenge to the legitimacy 
of the copyright system as a whole, since any property system where a large 
percentage of owners cannot be found is almost certainly broken. 
This Article outlines a blockchain based registry system to remedy the orphan 
works problem. 1   Although a mandatory register of copyright owners is an 
 
 1. See infra Section I.A et seq.  As a matter of nomenclature, the term “blockchain” can be used 
to refer to the “blockchain protocol,” that is, the technical architecture/description that can be used to 
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impossible and illegal proposition, our proposal uses a blockchain to create a register 
of attempts to search for copyright owners.  The blockchain is the technical protocol 
at the heart of Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that has recently spurred examinations of 
how we might revolutionize the legal system across regimes as wide-ranging as real 
property and deed registration, property law in digital environments, share registries, 
privacy, banking and payments, commercial paper and secured transactions, and 
currency systems, amongst others.2  The blockchain is a type of “distributed ledger”, 
a phrase which captures the essence of the technology.  Simply put, the blockchain 
is a technical protocol to create a secure, transparent ledger that reports transactions 
to everyone within a given network.3  Our proposal is to use the blockchain ledger—
in conjunction with a small change to the copyright system and a simple 
implementation of artificial intelligence technology—to solve the orphan works 
problem.  
There are three elements to the proposal.  Because the Berne Convention and 
TRIPS agreements prohibit mandatory copyright formalities that might generate a 
registry of rights holders, most orphan works clearance mechanisms are anchored 
around a good-faith, diligent search for an owner.  Unfortunately, a diligent search 
for a copyright holder is expensive, and search costs are sufficient to prevent many 
uses of orphan works, especially large-scale uses by cultural institutions.4  The first 
component of our proposal is therefore an artificial intelligence system to perform a 
diligent search for a rights holder.  There has already been some discussion, and 
experimental implementation of, diligent search systems in Europe.  And while those 
deployments of automation are a substantial step towards making orphan works 
available, we argue that the process could be dramatically improved with one primary 
mechanism:  a dynamic, imutable, auditable record of those searches. 
The second component of our proposal is a blockchain register where every search 
for a work’s owner can be recorded.  That register of searches has the potential to 
bring evidential significance to an automated system for diligent searches for use by 
anyone, rather than it being exclusively a tool of institutional risk management.  
Think of this as a ledger where every work that may be an orphan has a page, and on 
that page is recorded each attempt by a would-be-user of that work to find the owner.  
For each orphan work there may be zero, one, two, or a million searches recorded, 
 
create a distributed ledger, or to a particular instance of this architecture, such as the blockchain 
implementation that underlies Bitcoin.  In this article we will generally refer to the blockchain protocol as 
“the blockchain” and any given instance as “a blockchain.”  But where we don’t, the context will make 
the usage clear.  In the context of this article, “Bitcoin” is used to refer to the currency generally, while 
“bitcoin” refers to a unit of the currency. 
 2. See, e.g., Josh Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015); Primavera De Filippi, The 
Interplay Between Decentralization and Privacy:  The Case of Blockchain Technologies, 7 J. PEER PROD. 
1 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/E5ZQ-WSGY; GARETH W. PETERS & EFSTATHIOS PANAYI, 
BANKING BEYOND BANKS AND MONEY 240-76 (Paolo Tasca et al. ed., 2016). 
 3. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (Nov. 1, 2008), 
https://perma.cc/4B6X-9ZUD. 
 4. Anna Vuopala, Assessment of the Orphan works issue and Costs for Rights Clearance, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 2010), https://perma.cc/U7TE-SW5S. 
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and every time someone looks for the owner of the work the search is collected and 
recorded.  To help in the conceptualization of this part of the proposal, it might be 
helpful just to think of this as a hardcopy book of searches that is controlled by a 
government or private agency, although the reality is more interesting. 
The third component of our proposal is a legal mechanism that delivers works into 
orphanhood, and affords a right to use those works after a search for a rights holder 
is deemed “diligent.”  Although a diligent search requirement for orphan works 
clearance is not in the U.S. copyright system, it is present in a limited way within 
European copyright systems and is in no way inconsistent with the international 
copyright system.  The change proposed here would provide any user of an orphan 
work with an assurance that they were acting legally as long as they had performed 
a diligent search for the work’s owner.  If the “diligence” of a search defines the 
orphan status of a work, the determination and verification of “diligence” become 
important tasks.  Should we leave the assessment of diligence to the prospective user, 
the courts, or an administrative body?  Alternatively, could it be defined by the 
technical architecture recording the nature and extent of searches for a rights holder?  
The answer depends on the contours of the legal architecture selected to provide 
a use right on the basis of a diligent search.  Different legal approaches leave the 
search and a verification of its diligence to different parties, and selecting the most 
desirable mechanism inevitably involves a trade-off between human oversight, the 
integrity of property rights, and legal certainty.  For instance, a right to use an orphan 
work might be through limitation on liability after a judicial verification of a diligent 
search where the blockchain registry can be used as evidence.  Alternatively, use of 
orphan works may be permitted by a statutorily mandated, nonexclusive, compulsory 
license, vested to a party when the search for owners achieved a technically 
determined “diligence” threshold.  In such a case, the orphan works blockchain might 
take on the character of a real property registration system, where the right is vested 
by virtue of registration.5 
To a certain degree, a sophisticated technical architecture could ameliorate the 
short-comings of each legal mechanism.  However, a better approach would be to 
consider an appropriate legal architecture on the basis of what the technological 
architecture can achieve, meaning the technology should participate centrally in any 
legal reform.  Accordingly, this Article explores several existing and proposed legal 
architectures for addressing orphan works, and evaluates how they might be 
augmented by, or even embedded into, the technical architecture we outline.  Using 
a technological system, especially an automated one, to make legal decisions and 
define legal categories raises complex theoretical questions.6  The blockchain and 
automation are reinvigorating discussions around the relationship between law, 
 
 5. See, e.g., R.G. Patton, The Torrens System of Land Title Registration, 19 MINN. L. REV. 519 
(1934). 
 6. See, e.g., Vaios Karavas & Gunther Teubner, www.CompanyNameSux.com:  The Horizontal 
Effect of Fundamental Rights on ‘Private Parties’ within Autonomous Internet Law, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1335, 
1335–58 (2008). 
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technology, and governance.7  This is especially true for government processes that 
involve registration, and even more so where that registration produces significant 
legal consequences. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I describes blockchain technology and its 
relevance for copyright.  That Part also outlines the orphan works problem in more 
detail, exposing how and where blockchain technology could be useful.  Part II 
outlines the technical formation that we suggest to drive a highly effective orphan 
works clearance system.  This includes a description of the diligent search expert 
system, a blockchain register of searches, and the potential use of smart contracts as 
“smart licenses” to automate various licensing processes including escrow, payments 
and updating of copyright status.  Part III describes various existing and proposed 
legal architectures for addressing orphan works, and how they might be 
complimented or adapted by the technology we propose.  This includes a discussion 
of how legal consequences might be attributed to the technology, the significance of 
automating legal and governmental functions, and the compromises and risks this 
proposal entails. 
The conclusion of our Article demonstrates a range of complementary legal and 
technological architectures that, in various formations, can be deployed to address 
the orphan works problem.  We argue these technological systems are useful for 
general enhancement of the public domain through the existence of a growing 
registry of gray status works and clarified conditions for their use.  The selection and 
design of any particular implementation is a choice for policy makers and 
technologists; the goal here is to demonstrate the utility of the technology and to 
clarify and promote its role in any potential law reform. 
I. BLOCKCHAINS AND ORPHAN WORKS 
The first component of our proposal is a blockchain where every search for a 
work’s owner can be recorded.  We explain the details of our proposed technical 
architecture below, but it is important first to understand the nature of the 
blockchain.8 
A. A TECHNICAL HISTORY OF BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAINS 
The blockchain is the underlying architecture of Bitcoin, the cryptocurrency that 
has been a focal point of financial journalism over the last four or five years.  The 
idea of a digital money system independent of the state has been a shining talisman 
for a certain set of people called, variously, “cyberlibertarians”, “crypto-anarchists,” 
 
 7. See, e.g., Riika Koulu, Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts as an 
Alternative to Enforcement, 13 SCRIPTED 41 (2016); Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, 
Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with https://perma.cc/H9AS-BDY7); Melanie Swan, Blockchains may replace the 
institutions that safeguard commercial activities, LSE BUS REV. (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/PVJ4-L3NP. 
 8. See infra Section I.B et seq. 
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or “nutjobs.”  While Bitcoin has been cheerily discussed on NPR and NBC, it has 
politically radical roots.  The blueprint for cryptocurrency was first floated in the 
early 1990’s in the techno-ideological ether of the Cypherpunks mailing list. 9  
Cypherpunks generally endorse the premise that cryptography—the art and science 
of encrypting information—can be used to effect positive political and social 
change.10 
Author and Intel engineer Tim May was one of the founders of the Cypherpunks 
mailing list.  He used the list to promote “crypto-anarchy,” that is, the use of 
cryptography to facilitate private contractual ordering, promote individual liberty, 
and dismantle the nation-state.  According to May, governments had and would 
continue to suppress popular cryptography.  As he explained in the 1988 “Crypto 
Anarchist Manifesto”: 
The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of this technology, citing national 
security concerns, use of the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of 
societal disintegration.  Many of these concerns will be valid; crypto anarchy will allow 
national secrets to be trade [sic] freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be 
traded.  An anonymous computerized market will even make possible abhorrent 
markets for assassinations and extortion.  Various criminal and foreign elements will 
be active users of CryptoNet.  But this will not halt the spread of crypto anarchy.11 
May’s message struck home with a sizeable contingent of early “netizens” who 
were concerned—correctly, it turned out—that territorial governments would 
attempt to limit the freedoms on the new electronic frontier and turn it into a tool for 
surveillance.  Resistance through encryption was seen as necessary to escape the 
looming threat of government power.12  
On November 27, 1998, a person calling himself Wei Dai posted a message to 
Cypherpunk that primarily concerned a new protocol for network encryption.13  But 
he also included a link to a short essay on his own website, which began:  “I am 
fascinated by Tim May’s crypto-anarchy.  Unlike the communities traditionally 
associated with the word ‘anarchy’, in a crypto-anarchy the government is not 
temporarily destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently unnecessary.”14  
 
 9. The group indicates that its interests involve “remailers, anonymous peer-to-peer services, 
secure network tunnels, mobile voice encryption, untraceable electronic cash, secure operating 
environments, etc.”  Lucky Green, Trusted Computing Platform Alliances: The Mother(board) of all Big 
Brothers, CYPHERPUNKS, https://perma.cc/8T3A-PMLZ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).  See generally Steven 
Levy, CRYPTO (2001) for a popular account of cypherpunk history and ideology. 
 10. See Timothy C. May, True Nyms and Crypto Anarchy (1996), in TRUE NAMES: AND THE 
OPENING OF THE CYBERSPACE FRONTIER 33-86 (Vernor Vinge et al. eds., 1997). 
 11. Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INSTITUTE, 
https://perma.cc/V3FW-57VE. 
 12. Julian Assange was one notable participant in the Cypherpunks discussion. 
 13. The name Wei Dai is probably a pseudonym, and his public website contains no biographical 
information.  WEI DAI, https://perma.cc/R5ZJ-XX2Z (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
 14. Wei Dai, B-Money, WEI DAI, https://perma.cc/KWQ6-PA7X (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).  In 
fact, Wei Dai proposed two protocols:  the first one he indicated was flawed, but the second he suggested 
as an implementable system.
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Beginning from this philosophical position, Wei Dai furthered May’s crypto-
anarchic vision by sketching out a technology that would create an extra-
governmental value exchange system, called “b-money.”  Despite the lack of 
government control, Wei Dai’s b-money proposal would ensure that all transactions 
were verified by a decentralized network that would also hold an authoritative and 
permanent ledger.  The ledger would not symbolize value held in some other form, 
but would actually constitute that value.  Also, “new” b-money would be generated—
essentially, minted—by the expenditure of computer processing power in pursuit of 
solving the encryption challenges required by the protocol.15 
Ten years later, a person calling themselves Satoshi Nakomoto announced on 
several mailing lists that they had written a research paper implementing, with more 
specificity and detail, the core features of Wei Dai’s b-money proposal.  They called 
this implementation “Bitcoin,” and posted it to the website www.bitcoin.org, a 
domain created in August 2008.  Their paper’s first footnote cites Wei Dai’s 1998 
email message.16 
Nakomoto was as mysterious as Wei Dai.  Their original user profile indicated 
they lived in Japan, yet their email address was from a German free email provider.17  
Despite many attempts to unmask Nakomoto, it seems that their true identity will 
remain a mystery.18  Whoever they are, Nakomoto mined the first “genesis block” of 
bitcoins in January 2009, as well as a substantial number of early bitcoins, making 
them a potential billionaire at recent exchange valuations.19  Satoshi Nakomoto’s 
mystery and power has made them legendary within the Bitcoin community, a kind 
of crypto-libertarian mashup of Spartacus, Keyser Söze, and Jay Gatsby. 
For some years, there was a flurry of interest in Bitcoin, including exhaustive 
media stories, government and regulatory whitepapers, and academic articles in 
finance, economics, sociology, and law.  For the most part, these discussions focused 
on the challenge that cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin present to national sovereignty, 
currency control, and tax policy.  But around 2015, policy makers, economists, and 
legal academics began to notice that the blockchain—the distributed, transparent, 
and secure ledger that underlies Bitcoin—was, perhaps, a more interesting subject of 
study.20  The blockchain protocol can re-architect registry systems and provide for 
“trustless trust,” that is, guaranteeing the integrity of digital transactions without 
 
 15. See Wei Dai, supra note 14; Wei Dai, BITCOINWIKI, https://perma.cc/NLE2-YM3Q (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2017); Wei Dai, THE BOOK OF BITCOIN, https://perma.cc/A935-B8RF (last visited Oct. 
22, 2017). 
 16. See Nakamoto, supra note 3. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Andrew O’Hagan, The Satoshi Affair, 38 LON. R. BK 7 (2016); Chris Benjamin Wallace, The 
Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), https://perma.cc/UAG6-2T5M (suggesting 
that Nakamoto might be a team at Google, or at the National Security Agency, or at a financial institution).  
For more theories, see Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, COINDESK, https://perma.cc/XF9F-XHVW (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2017). 
 19. Alec Liu, Bitcoin Mints Its First Billionaire: Its Inventor, Satoshi Nakamoto, 
MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 30, 2013, 9:28 AM), https://perma.cc/FDA4-JKV3. 
 20. Mark Staples, Blockchain is Useful for a Lot More than Just Bitcoin, THE CONVERSATION (May 
10, 2016, 4:04 PM), https://perma.cc/9H7H-UZMQ. 
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trusted intermediaries like governments or banks.21  Once this had been observed, 
the relationship between Bitcoin and the blockchain shifted:  Bitcoin came to be seen 
as an interesting—possibly trivial—use of the transformatively disruptive 
blockchain technology. 
Why is the blockchain protocol transformative?  And how?  In short, the 
blockchain provides a way of guaranteeing that a record existed at a certain time.  It 
doesn’t matter what that record is—it can be a file, a piece of music, a transaction, a 
piece of digital art, an email—as long as it can be coded in data then coded onto, and 
retrieved from, a blockchain.  Further, the validity of this record is guaranteed by its 
presence on the blockchain, and not reliant on a third party guarantor. 
Blockchain’s core technology is a public key cryptographic algorithm similar to 
the ones used to secure credit card transactions over the web, or to secure text 
messages sent via Telegram or WhatsApp.  To add a record to a blockchain, a record 
is first run through the algorithm to create a unique, encrypted string of data called a 
“hash.”  This hash uniquely identifies the record, and guarantees its integrity, because 
there is no way that anyone can alter the hash without corrupting it.  Once a record 
has been “hashed,” it is then gathered together with a small number of other hashes 
of other records that that were encrypted around the same time.  This collection of 
hashes is called a “block.”  The first block created in any blockchain serves as a 
“genesis block”; each time a new block is created, it is linked to the last block, 
thereby creating a cryptographically-connected chain of blocks.  This is why the 
protocol is called the “blockchain”:  it is a chain of blocks of hashes, which 
cryptographically encodes every single transaction that has occurred within that 
blockchain.  An example might make this clearer.  Bitcoin, the best-known 
blockchain implementation, is a series of public records that begins with the first 
transfer of bitcoins to the first account holder.  Many records have subsequently been 
added to the Bitcoin blockchain, some involving the creation of new bitcoins and 
others recording the transfer of bitcoins from one account holder to the other.22 
At its heart, then, the blockchain is simply a ledger of transactions, much like an 
electronic version of a handwritten bank ledger.  But the blockchain ledger is unusual 
and profound in at least two ways.  First, the blockchain records all of the transactions 
 
 21. Kevin D. Werbach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, BERKELY TECH. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with BERKELY TECH. L.J.) (quoting Reid Hoffman, Why the Blockchain 
Matters, WIRED (May 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/TL95-RVJP). 
 22. The Bitcoin blockchain has a particular technical wrinkle that is necessary for a currency 
system:  the coins have to be brought into being through a process called “mining.”  Bitcoin miners (at 
least currently) receive new bitcoins in exchange for verifying new ledger entries, based on a process 
called “proof of work.”  Proof of Work, BITCOINWIKI, https://perma.cc/7Q5U-VT9D (last visited Oct. 22, 
2017).  To become a miner, one downloads the Bitcoin client software and competes to record new 
transactions; at the same time, one spends some portion of his or her computer’s processing power to solve 
complex mathematical puzzles.  De Filippi & Wright, supra note 7, at 7.  Security of the system is 
guaranteed by ensuring that the processing power of the network is not concentrated in the hands of any 
one person or group:  as long as no-one controls more than fifty percent of the blockchain network, the 
system is guaranteed to be secure.  As Nakamoto put it: “The system is secure as long as honest nodes 
collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes.”  See Nakomoto, 
supra note 3, at 1.  
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that ever occurred within the network.  The technology of the blockchain is such that 
one party cannot make any transaction without the transaction being duly recorded 
in the authoritative ledger.  Transactions from A to B can be disguised by circuitous 
misdirection—A might give to C, D, and E (and thousands of others shell 
transactions) before the endpoint when the transaction ends with B.  However, with 
patience, one can wade through the ledger and ascertain originating and receiving 
addresses.  Like the Domesday Book of William the Conqueror, the blockchain 
ledger tells the complete story of the division of property interests.  Unlike the 
Domesday Book, it is the perfect map. 
The second feature of the blockchain ledger is that it is public and indiscriminate.  
It is possible to create both public and private blockchains, but the distinction here is 
somewhat misleading.23   All blockchains are transparent to their members, and 
“private” blockchains are only private to the extent that not everyone is entitled to 
join that blockchain.  Once you become a member of a public or private blockchain, 
you become privy to a complete copy of every transaction ever made on that 
blockchain. 
The significance of such ledger features is profound.  As the U.K. whitepaper on 
uses of blockchain in government notes, these technologies could “help governments 
to collect taxes, deliver benefits, issue passports, record land registries, assure the 
supply chain of goods and generally ensure the integrity of government records and 
services.”24  Any system of laws that relies on an authoritative register is about to be 
transformed, and each week brings a new raft of announcements about the use of 
blockchains in title deed registration, securities issuing, digital identity, and other 
“governmental” functions.25  We propose a similar possibility for copyright and 
orphan works.  
B. BLOCKCHAINS AND GOVERNANCE 
The use of blockchain within copyright here goes beyond its use as “a cost 
efficient and secure way of storing assets of various types and in addition achieve a 
better interoperability due to the open, distributed, and global architecture.” 26  
Rather, a copyright blockchain ledger precisely addresses the problems and 
 
 23. Public and private blockchains are sometimes termed “permissionless” and “permissioned,” 
respectively.  Bitcoin and Ethereum are the best examples of public or permissionless blockchains, which 
any computer may join or leave at any time.  Permissioned or private blockchains have generally been 
used for financial databases, and at the core of most implementations of legal registers.  See PETERS & 
PANAYI, supra note 2, at 244. 
 24. GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF SCIENCE, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK 
CHAIN 6 (2016), available at https://perma.cc/XYZ5-ZQSD. 
 25. See Jonathan Keane, Sweden Moves to Next Stage With Blockchain Land Registry, COINDESK 
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/CPE4-9L9Z; Taketoshi Mori, Financial Technology:  Blockchain and 
Securities Settlement, 8 J. SEC. OPERATIONS & CUSTODY 208 (2016); Laura Shin, The Identity Solution, 
FORBES (Jun. 22, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/C2WL-PLUD; William Mougayar, The Blockchain 
is Perfect for Government Services, COINDESK (Sep. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/7J6H-ZE4X.   
 26. Svein Ølnes, Beyond Bitcoin:  Enabling Smart Government Using Blockchain Technology, in 
ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT 253, 254 (Springer 2016). 
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inefficiencies associated within hierarchical, centralized organizational structures 
like state bureaucracies and firms (for instance, Copyright Management 
Organizations “CMOs”) that are ordinarily involved in orphan works rights 
clearance.27  For example, prior exercises in compulsory licensing of orphan works 
have struggled with these inefficiencies to the point of making the administrative 
process unfeasible.  The primary roadblock is the need for, and the expense 
associated with, the administrative agency verifying the adequacy and diligence of 
the applicants’ search effort.  Producing a consensus around the necessary facts and 
conditions that would define orphanhood becomes impossible.  Distributed ledgers 
precisely facilitate such consensus and coordination with less intermediation and 
greater efficiency, enabling different legal models and governance structures for 
orphan works use. 
Distributed ledgers enable transaction platforms between government and citizen, 
government data sharing and analytics, and transparency in government business and 
administrative processes. 28   However, using distributed ledgers to administer 
governmental or quasi-governmental registries raises its own questions.  
Applications like Bitcoin require multiple installations for cryptographic integrity, 
without which “it would simply amount to an encrypted centralized system.”29  Open 
ledgers are generally verified through incentive mechanisms, where “miners” incur 
processing costs in order to perform the cryptographic functions that keep the system 
operating.  Without miners, the blockchain is, at heart, a private recording system 
maintained by whomsoever pays for the processing power.  Without an economic 
incentive to perform that cryptographic work, as Saifedean Ammous argues, “[t]he 
security of the system rests on the security of the central party funding the miners.”30  
This raises questions as to whether blockchain technology is appropriate for 
government services that may not want to engage with fully decentralized 
architectures. 
On the other hand, while Bitcoin-type blockchains that use miners and “proof of 
work” cryptography to incentivise the security of the system may be more mature, 
blockchain projects with alternative consensus mechanisms, like “proof-of-stake”, as 
well as other blockchain architectures, like the IBM-supported HyperLedger Fabric 
Project, may be better suited for government service applications. 31   These 
developments will likely expand the applicability of distributed ledgers beyond the 
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scope of fungible assets such as money and property, and into other arenas, including 
non-exclusive copyright licenses. 32   Accordingly, despite being anathema to 
blockchain purists, “permissioned” closed blockchains (shared ledgers limited to 
trusted nodes) or even “sidechains” (which share the Bitcoin blockchain but use 
different addresses) may be more viable for services of general interest rather than 
services carrying clear financial incentives.33  Such systems can be designed for 
specific purposes with bespoke consensus and verification systems and can demand 
different levels of control.34  
Rather than simply providing a new technology for data and record management, 
distributed ledgers introduce institutional technologies that allow new means of 
coordinating economic activity. 35   As Davidson, De Filippi and Potts note, 
“[d]istributed ledgers are a technology for manufacturing consensus about facts that 
are instrumental to economic coordination, a role historically dominated in market 
capitalist economies by governments and large firms.”36  The ledgers on which 
modern institutional structures and commerce are built are typically centralized not 
only in governments, but also in layers of bureaucracy and extra-governmental 
bodies, such as corporations.  In the case of copyright orphan works, generated 
because of a prohibition on registration as a formality to obtain copyright, the ledgers 
do not exist at all.  By generating the consensus necessary for economic coordination, 
the blockchain provides an institutional logic uniquely useful for orphan works rights 
clearance.  To date, the majority of interest in distributed ledgers and copyright has 
focused on producing registers of copyright protected works.  However, 
understanding the various limitations for that application clarifies the greater benefits 
of applying the blockchain technology to enhancing the public domain. 
C. BLOCKCHAINS AND COPYRIGHT 
Recent attention in copyright registries has focused on renewed forms of in-
copyright registration, rather than public license or use systems.  Mandatory 
registration of copyrighted works, however, would unquestionably violate the Berne 
Convention, and attempts to create copyright registries have experienced limited 
success;37 this is true whether the registry was created by governmental agencies or 
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the private sector.  For example, the European Global Repertoire Database, which 
was supposed to aggregate information regarding musical works and associated 
rights, began to struggle after collecting societies withdrew their support for the 
project.  Similarly, the U.K. Copyright Hub has not yet achieved its aim of simple 
licensing.  Commercial attempts have fared little better.  The International Music 
Joint Venture was formed in 2000 by a group of collection societies including the 
Dutch PRO Buma/Stemra, ASCAP from the U.S., PRS from the U.K., and the 
Canadian SOCAN.  This ended in an ignominious failure, as did the International 
Music Registry project, which was backed by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.  A third attempt, the Global Repertoire Database, was equally 
unsuccessful, notwithstanding the presence of most of the important rights holders, 
CMOs, and numerous technology companies, together with significant funding.  The 
attempt was first proposed in 2008, had a brief flowering from 2010 to 2013, and 
folded in 2014.38 
In the past few years, voluntary, privately operated blockchain-based copyright 
registries have also proliferated.39  These range in sophistication from simple proof 
of existence models—wherein works are hashed and time-stamped with the author 
holding onto the private encryption key giving them the ability to prove that a 
particular document was authored at a particular time—to more complex applications 
such as the real time tracking of transactions of rights.  For example, it is possible to 
create a hash of a copyright work and place it on a blockchain, as a “proof of 
existence” of that file.  By merely stringing these hashes on a blockchain, one can 
create a registry database that proves the existence of various copyright works at a 
given point in time and, unlike other copyright registry proposals, this approach does 
not require a centralised controlling institution for management and maintenance.40  
That hash can also be used to facilitate tracking of licenses and assignments of rights.  
That is, each time a copyright work is licensed or assigned, the transaction is entered 
on the blockchain, thereby creating a record of every transaction involving that work.  
Alternatively, “tokens” on a blockchain can represent copyright protected content.  
This approach uses “currency” to represent ownership of digital data and is often the 
approach suggested for real property registration.41  Both of these methods use the 
affordances of the blockchain to reintroduce “property” characteristics to intangible 
digital content.42   In more sophisticated iterations, we might see automating of 
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licensing according to conditions prescribed through scripting protocols such as 
those developed on the Ethereum blockchain, which will be used for rights 
management, as well as automating and directing the movement of currency in 
financial transactions.43  This would involve copyright ownership and licenses being 
written in the form of “smart contracts,” to be uploaded and run on a blockchain.44  
These “contracts” are composed of code capable of transacting rights, records of 
which are apparent on the ledger.45  They might be thought of as an intelligent escrow 
system that transfers interests or money according to an automated process rather 
than human intercession.  Imagine an international freight logistics contract that is 
executed automatically once the recipient confirms delivery of the shipment in good 
order.46 
In the case of copyright, smart contracts can thus facilitate licensing with 
individual parties transacting via software on the blockchain.  Here, transactions 
would be primarily verified through code rather than through interacting with trusted 
intermediaries like a copyright collecting agency, or with the rights holders 
themselves.  Smart licensing agreements, where the terms of a license are reflected 
in, or defined by, the smart contract, could similarly automate relatively complex 
rights management operations such as permission controls, attribution, and payment 
of royalties and mandates, based on the terms and conditions of a license.  Several 
parties are working on integrating these ledgers with content distribution systems and 
codecs, to create fully integrated, rights managed, content ecosystems.47 
Nonetheless, the use of blockchain for in-copyright registration and rights 
management is unlikely to be a panacea for orphan works or general copyright 
licensing, at least in the short term.  Because of the pressure placed upon them to 
become profitable, start ups attempting to provide blockchain registration and rights 
management services do so without taking advantage of the disintermediation 
functions that blockchain affords.  The international legal structure prohibiting 
formalities also makes registration difficult to incentivize.  Further, the staggering 
quantity of content produced daily suggests any comprehensive approach would 
require highly distributed management, as well as an automation system, to be 
sufficiently comprehensive.  On the other hand, the more that copyright material is 
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registered under voluntary systems, the more efficient any “diligent” search for a 
rights holder becomes.  These copyright registration systems thus play a useful role 
in the general copyright ecosystem, without necessarily contributing, at least in the 
short term, to any particular structural change or reform.  Accordingly, beyond 
creating new registries and transaction mechanisms for in-copyright works, we argue 
that there is value in using a blockchain-based registration system in concert with 
other technological mechanisms to create an orphan works clearance system that 
enhances the public domain.  Understanding the utility of a blockchain based 
approach for orphan works clearance requires an understanding of the orphan works 
problem, and how legal architectures might be usefully deployed alongside new 
technological architectures, to achieve a viable and effective solution.  A more 
complete understanding of the challenges surrounding orphan works is thus a 
necessary prerequisite to examining what a techno-legal architectural solution to this 
issue might look like. 
D. ORPHAN WORKS  
Changes in copyright administration regimes—including dramatic increases in 
the levels of content production, extensions of copyright terms, and the absence of 
formal registration—have generated ongoing challenges for copyright administration 
in the digital era.  Not least of these challenges are “orphan works”—works for whom 
a rights holder cannot be readily identified in order to obtain relevant permissions 
and licenses, or works for which a copyright status cannot be determined.48  Orphans 
arise in numerous contexts.  In the context of cultural collections comprising 
analogue media, it may be the case that the creators of a particular piece of media are 
unknown or cannot be contacted, meaning their works cannot be digitized, exhibited 
or preserved and become destined for deterioration, degradation or obsolescence.49  
Alternatively, digital works are often created without sufficient patronage 
information—metadata that would identify rights holders.  Even if initially attached, 
that patronage information may be removed during reproduction processes.  This 
generates artificial roadblocks preventing dissemination and repurposing or 
recontextualizing of works, as the production of new cultural material becomes 
impossible without obtaining permission, even when all parties might endorse this 
sort of reuse and remixing.50  The orphan works problem results in impediments to 
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expression,51 unintentional censorship,52 and widespread structural and systematic 
infringement because users acquiesce to the risk of infringement actions by using 
works without permission.53  Even though the risk of an action may be low, and even 
if use of works benefits the public without affecting the commercial interests of 
authors, use of these works without permission from the rights holder technically 
remains a copyright infringement.  The problems with the current copyright system 
are clearly summarized by Laura N. Bradrick: 
The orphan works problem is threefold:  first, it stifles creativity by limiting the public’s 
access to the piece; second, it defeats the economic incentive to create copyrightable 
works because no one can receive the potential royalty if the copyright owner cannot 
be found; and third, it undermines copyright law by forcing some orphan works users 
to violate infringement laws, despite efforts to comply.54 
The result is that, in both digital and analogue scenarios, without prohibitively 
expensive searches for rights holders, works become effectively locked away from 
the public, incapable of legitimately contributing to the knowledge economy.55 
The last ten to fifteen years have witnessed a series of reform proposals, along 
with market led mechanisms like the Google Books settlement56 and various legal 
mechanisms addressing orphan works.  These proposals generally include a 
combination of a reasonably diligent (or qualifying) search for a rights holder, a 
centralized orphan works database, and a license fee paid into escrow.  Proposals 
vary in their preference for a copyright exception, a limitation on liability, 57  a 
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statutory compulsory license,58 or a voluntary or extended collective license.59  Ex 
ante approaches require particular action taken prior to use in order to obtain a 
copyright exception or license.60  These solutions define an orphan work according 
to the diligent search, verified by some body or agency.  Other approaches permit 
immediate use of works as orphans, on the basis of a softer definition for orphan 
works, with any legal consequences only invoked if a rights holder subsequently 
emerges—at which point the quality of the user’s diligent search is examined.  These 
are called ex post regimes because they afford limitations on liability or safe harbors 
after the use.61 
Different approaches also facilitate different uses of orphan works for different 
users.  For instance, the European Orphan Works Directive only permits non-
commercial uses of orphan works by cultural institutions, defined as “publicly 
accessible libraries, educational establishments and museums, archives, film or audio 
heritage institutions and public service broadcasters.”62  These cultural institutions 
may only reproduce or make the material available online within their public interest 
missions, for purposes like mass digitization and preservation or for low quality 
reproductions for catalogues. 63   Other approaches, for instance under extended 
collective licensing and compulsory licensing regimes, facilitate commercial uses by 
the public at large. 
Whatever the approach taken to the orphan works problem, virtually all existing 
mechanisms and all proposed solutions arrive at undesirable compromises between 
competing interests and outcomes.  Accordingly, there is renewed interest in global 
orphan works reform, especially considering the U.S. Copyright Office’s 2015 report 
on orphan works.64  Other jurisdictions have also recognized the need for a solution.  
For example, the Australian Productivity Commission identifies orphan and out-of-
commerce works as a key area for copyright reform.65  
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Many jurisdictions have yet to implement orphan works solutions, as they tend to 
interfere with property rights.  Orphan works solutions generally require reallocation 
of property rights to specific persons or general members of the public. 66  These 
reallocations interfere with copyright’s traditional provision of exclusive control 
over the use of one’s work, transforming property rights into liability rights. 67  
Orphan works approaches thus often receive opposition from various groups of 
content creators, typically professional visual and graphic artists, and especially 
professional photographers. 68   With certain elements of different approaches 
offending each group differently, no single approach affords a killer solution.  All 
mechanisms include tradeoffs in scope and utility on the basis of ideological or 
practical concerns.  However, we argue that new technologies have the capacity to 
drastically improve outcomes and overcome many of the obstacles associated with 
existing mechanisms. 
In Part II, we therefore outline our blockchain solution to the orphan works 
problem and contrast it with the many different proposals that others have made.  Our 
conclusion will be that the implementation of a technical solution avoids problems 
that have beset other solutions. 
II. A TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Below is a general outline of the technical formation we propose to enable public 
use of orphan works.  It involves:  (1) an automated system capable of performing a 
“diligent search”; (2) a blockchain registry of all searches undertaken for a particular 
work; and (3) a legal mechanism that can deploy that registry towards orphan works 
(as well as other light-permission works) clearance.  We do not prescribe here exactly 
which sorts of works should be available under this system—the approach described 
will work for a range of orphan works and lightly-permissioned works.  The goal 
here is to outline the various possibilities that the technology can enable. 
A. AUTOMATED DILIGENT SEARCH 
A diligent or “qualifying” search for rights holders remains a central concept for 
most orphan works proposals, since the inability to determine or locate a rights holder 
is often what defines particular content as orphaned.69  Unfortunately, a diligent 
search is an onerous requirement and empirical research suggests it is often so 
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onerous that it prevents rights clearance,70 especially in large scale projects like mass 
digitization. 71   For instance, the Vuopala report to the European Commission 
identified the high transaction costs associated with rights clearance within the 
context of cultural institutions,72  noting exorbitant clearance costs for relatively 
limited numbers of works.73  The report concluded that:  “The information gathered 
shows that on [sic] nearly every sector too much time and effort have been spent on 
clearing of rights for the digitisation and online accessibility of works in collections 
of cultural institutions.”74 
Delivering what constitutes a diligent search has proved challenging and 
generated significant political argument and opposition.  While larger commercial 
technology and media interests might push for flexibility in what constitutes a 
diligent search, other stakeholders prefer firmer criteria, criticizing flexibility as a 
move to exploit the work of “hard to reach” copyright owners and reduce the number 
of lawsuits for infringements from larger commercial interests in the creative field.75  
The question of which entity should be tasked with verifying the diligence of a 
search, and thus ultimately how a work is legally characterized as orphaned, remains 
contested.76  Should it be left to users and only verified through litigation in an ex 
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(Beelden voor de Toekomst), the total cost of handling rights clearance for 500,000 photographs and 5,000 
films has been estimated to be 625,000 [euro]—3 people will be clearing rights for 4 years in this project.”   
Vuopala, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 74. Id. at 35.  There were equally striking findings from the UK Intellectual Property Office.  See 
U.K. INTELL. PROP. OFF., FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON ORPHAN WORKS 7–11 (2012), available at 
https://perma.cc/22TZ-2SMJ.  See also DAVID HANSEN, DIGITIZING ORPHAN WORKS:  LEGAL 
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RISKS FOR OPEN ACCESS TO COPYRIGHTED ORPHAN WORKS 26–29 (Kyle K. 
Courtney & Peter Suber eds., 2016) (providing a general overview of these issues), available at 
https://perma.cc/NQ3D-9TYC. 
 75. Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, Unhand That Orphan:  Evolving Orphan Works 
Solutions Require New Analysis, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 21 (2009). 
 76. The impact of having to perform a diligent search also affects different users in different ways.  
David R. Hansen, Gwen Hinze, and Jennifer Urban have outlined the different entities that are actively 
tasked with performing a diligent search, as well as the different echelons of formality for diligent search 
and, accordingly, the different parties that need to verify the adequacy of a search.  These might be:  (1) 
users who perform the search alone, with no formal systems to guide or verify their efforts (such as in the 
failed U.S. limited liability proposals discussed below); (2) cultural institutions as verified by national and 
supranational bodies (such as under the EU Orphan Works Directive); (3) government copyright offices 
(at least to verify a search, as in the Canadian compulsory license model); or (4) collective management 
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post approach?  Or should verification be performed by a private firm or a 
government agency with the result a statutory compulsory license?77 
We suggest that the task of verifying the diligence of a search is dramatically 
simplified with a comprehensive record of all searches, and further that the 
production of a comprehensive record of searches is dramatically simplified and 
improved when the diligent search is performed by an automated expert system.  
There has already been some discussion of automated legal expert systems 
performing diligent searches for the sake of copyright exceptions under the E.U. 
Orphan Works Directive.  The Accessible Registries of Rights Information and 
Orphan Works Towards Europeana (“ARROW”) project began in 2008 as an 
endeavour to facilitate rights management within digitization projects. 78  
Stakeholders included national libraries, bibliographic agencies, publishers and 
authors associations, and copyright management organizations in various countries.  
One of ARROW’s goals, amongst others, was to automate as far as possible the 
diligent search process.79  The project was structured around:  (1) a web portal 
interface; (2) a rights information infrastructure that enabled a user to retrieve 
copyright status and ownership information from a network of databases, including 
libraries, databases of books in print, and repertoires of reproduction rights 
organizations; and (3) a registry in which that information could be deposited, 
including a subsection of the registry referring to works that were declared “probably 
orphan” as a product of users filtering information through the portal.80  The project 
was limited, however, in terms of the kinds of works it applied to; only books and 
manuscripts were covered.  Further, it is not a publicly available system, with only 
specific users contemplated by the interface and framing.  Its development ended in 
2013. 
A more sophisticated proposal is found in the EnDOW “Diligent Search” project, 
which is being researched and built by the CREATe group.81  This project also seeks 
automation of diligent search, ostensibly under the auspices of both the EU copyright 
exception and the UK orphan works licensing regime.82  Both these orphan works 
mechanisms require a diligent search, after consultation of a number of “appropriate 
 
organizations (under extended collective licensing models, which, as discussed below, may produce a 
conflict of interests and transparency issues).  See David R. Hansen et al., Orphan Works and the Search 
for Rightsholders:  Who Participates in a “Diligent Search” Under Present and Proposed Regimes? 
(Berkeley Digital Library Copyright Project, White Paper No. 4, 2013), available at 
https://perma.cc/Y54T-HZ2C [hereinafter, Hansen White Paper]. 
 77. Bradrick, supra note 54, at 539 (arguing that a key reason why the Orphan Works Act of 2008 
failed to become law was because of the uncertainty surrounding what constituted a “diligent search”). 
 78. Cinzia Caroli et al., ARROW:  Accessible Registries of Rights Information and Orphan Works 
Towards Europeana, 18 D-LIB MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2012), https://perma.cc/8LP4-P7VW. 
 79. Along with demonstrating how to handle digital copyright problems in practice, foster 
collaboration between authors, publishers and libraries, and provide contact information for rights holders. 
 80. Caroli et al., supra note 78. 
 81. Kristofer Erickson, How Crowdsourcing Might Solve the Astronomical Challenge of Copyright 
Clearance, CREATE BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/WCJ3-KP6U. 
 82. Introduced under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24, § 77 (Eng.), amending 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 116A (Eng.). 
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sources.”  Although those sources are not specified in the legislation, there is 
guidance, produced by the Intellectual Property Office, as well as sources listed in 
Regulations,83 which include the various orphan works registries.  The UK Copyright 
Designs and Patent Act 1988 also specifies some sources.84  Following those guiding 
documents, the EnDOW project has produced a decision support system capable of 
querying orphan works repositories85 for the purpose of satisfying the diligent search 
criteria in the exception and licensing regime.  The rationale is overcoming the 
transaction costs associated with diligent search for cultural institutions.86  Their 
system requires inputs such as:  “Who is the author?,” “When did the author die?,” 
“To whom have the rights been transferred?,” and so on.87  They have produced 
elaborate decision trees that encode the complexities of the existing laws. 
EnDOW researchers have broadened their proposal by suggesting extending the 
use of crowdsourcing to incentivise orphan works clearance.88  The system is thus 
open to the public, including international users—following the requirements of 
every jurisdiction in which it would operate—for the purpose of clearing rights on 
behalf of cultural institutions.89  The utility of the scheme is an automated system 
capable of performing accurate and legally “valid” diligent searches on items 
contained in the collections of cultural institutions.90   
While this endeavour should be lauded, further developments could increase the 
range and efficacy of such a system.  For digital or digitized works, a copy of the 
work itself including as much descriptive metadata as possible could be an input for 
the system.91  That data could then be searched against metadata and multimedia 
fingerprints in specified repositories, catalogues and registries.92  Content ID and 
fingerprinting (also known as perceptual hashing or content-based media 
identification), 93  could operate through the production of “signatures” that 
 
 83. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations 2014, SI 
2014/2863 (Eng.); Erickson, supra note 81.  
 84. Copyright Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c.48, sch. ZA1 (Eng.). 
 85. Borghi et al., supra note 61, at 150-51 (suggesting that between 30%-50% of databases required 
to begin a diligent search were not publicly available). 
 86. Id. at 152. 
 87. Borghi et al., supra note 61, at 163; Aura Bertoni, Flavia Guerrieri & Maria Lillà Montagnani, 
Requirements for Diligent Search in 20 European Countries, ENDOW (June 2017), 
https://perma.cc/USZ9-GGA7. 
 88. Borghi et al., supra note 61, at 157; Erickson, supra note 81. 
 89. Borghi et al., supra note 61, at 159-60. 
 90. Id. at 162-63. 
 91. For works that do have alphanumeric identifiers, there are also issues around consistent spelling 
that could be addressed using fuzzy logic and neural networks capable of comparing works with similar 
but non-identical titles and identifying information. 
 92. An adequately sophisticated iteration of this expert system would, if an author were identified, 
and their work were found on an adequately sophisticated registry, inform the user of the necessary 
licensing conditions, and facilitate a transaction, on the basis of a block chain based smart contract, rather 
than requiring negotiation with the owner directly.  In this way, the system also functions as a clearing 
house for in-copyright works. 
 93. Sunil Lee & Chang D. Yoo, Robust Video Fingerprinting for Content-Based Video 
Identification, 18 IEEE: TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECH. 983, 983 (2008), 
https://perma.cc/U3CX-44CL. 
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summarise particular media or multimedia content,94 or certain unique features of 
that content.95  The fingerprint would be run through a matching algorithm to identify 
the closest match for96  the unlabelled content to any corresponding fingerprints 
stored in databases that reference metadata, thus identifying copyright owners and 
ownership status.97  Signatures might be in the form of, amongst others, waveforms 
and wavelets (for audio), or cryptographic hashes (wherein hash values rather than 
whole files are compared).  Unfortunately, hashing is generally too sensitive to 
content manipulation to be particularly useful for content ID, as it fails if a user 
makes “minor modifications to a given multimedia document that would result in a 
significantly different fingerprint.”98  As has been noted, “hash values are fragile, a 
single bit flip is sufficient for the hash to completely change,” an observation that 
suggests the need for a hash protocol sufficiently robust to guard against content-
preserving transformations. 99   Nevertheless, content ID systems would prove 
extremely useful to whatever degree they could match queried content with material 
relevant repositories, even if they only produce percentage likelihoods of matches. 
Another way to expand the utility of automated diligent search is by opening the 
system to the public to facilitate clearing works for users’ own benefit, rather than 
only cultural institutions.  This takes the system beyond the horizons of the EU 
Orphan Works exception.  Indeed, the idea of crowd-sourcing for the sake of clearing 
rights on behalf of cultural institutions would make more sense if the crowd were 
incentivized.  If the licensing regime were opened to the public at large and users 
could perform, and potentially pay for, a diligent search for a work as the need arose, 
then one might expect broader use of the system.  This would result ultimately in a 
far more prolific clearance and registration system for orphan works.  We suggest, 
therefore, that a broad open access platform would become far more useful if a use 
right could be obtained by the public at large for a variety of uses, including 
commercial uses. This would incentivize numerous parties to channel works through 
the platform. The EnDOW project  discovered the problem of limited access (i.e. 
payment required) for some databases and catalogs necessary to perform diligent 
searches effectively.  The technical architecture’s user interface might overcome this 
with an upfront fee that covered access to relevant databases. 
 
 94. Note that this is different from audio watermarking “in which an arbitrary message can be 
embedded in a recording without altering the perception of the sound.”  Pedro Cano et al., Audio 
Fingerprinting: Concepts and Applications, in STUDIES IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MODELLING AND PREDICTION 234, 234 (Saman K. Halgamuge & 
Lipo P. Wang ed., Springer 2005).  Fingerprinting is a more useful mechanism than watermarking for our 
purposes because watermarking requires the wherewithal to include metadata, which suggests the owners 
is already acting to protect their copyright, whereas fingerprinting can be applied after the fact. 
 95. Avinash L. Varna et al., A Framework for Theoretical Analysis, 7541 MEDIA FORENSICS & 
SECURITY II 1, 1-2 (2010). 
 96. Lee & Yoo, supra note 93, at 985. 
 97. Pedro Cano et al., A Review of Audio Fingerprinting, 41 J. VLSI SIGNAL PROCESSING 271, 271 
(2005), https://perma.cc/KUN9-8VMQ. 
 98. Varna et al., supra note 95, at 1.  
 99. Cano et al., supra note 97, at 271. 
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The final augmentation of automated diligent search, one that effectively 
facilitates verification of search diligence by producing consensus around the status 
of a works’ author, would be combining the expert system with a distributed registry 
that records performed searches and a smart license implementation system.  Under 
the EnDOW model, verification of searches performed by the system remains a 
necessity.  The authors note: 
In order to be practicable for cultural institutions, the guided diligent searches 
performed by end-users would require review and approval by the cultural institution 
holding the item, ensuring that the requirements of national legislation and the best 
practices of the specific sector are met, but also increasing costs relative to a purely 
automated system.  By automating laborious parts of the processes, and automatically 
adapting search instances to relevant legislation, the crowdsourcing system could still 
be expected to reduce costs.100  
However, as we argue in the sections that follow, the inclusion of a blockchain 
registry would improve the efficiency of the verification process, and might result—
in due course—in a fully automated system of orphan works licensing. 
B. BLOCKCHAIN ORPHAN WORKS REGISTRY 
As discussed above, we do not see copyright registration as the most effective 
implementation of orphan works.  That said, registries specific to orphan works have 
not proved particularly viable or useful either.  For example, orphan works 
registration is part of the European Orphan Works Directive.101  Administered by a 
central European body, the orphan works database provides information about works 
cleared as orphans under the European regime, ostensibly in order to avoid search 
duplication.  However, because of the narrow scope of the European system, the 
database has limited utility.  As it only applies to digitization of works actually held 
physically in a cultural institution’s collection, search duplication is never likely to 
occur—for example, because it is widely known that the Louve owns the Mona Lisa, 
a search for its painter need only ever be conducted by one institution.  This probably 
accounts for the fact that while there are barely more than two thousand entries in 
the European Orphan Works database at the time of writing,102 the national UK 
database does not even have five hundred. 103   More useful projects include 
ARROW104 (discussed above) which includes a register of works declared “likely 
orphan” as part of a broader rights management project,105 the European MILE 
(“Metadata Image Library Exploitation”) project which looks at possibly-orphaned 
fine art images, and a register that was absorbed into the WATCH (“Writers Artists 
 
 100. Borghi et al., supra note 61, at 161. 
 101. Vuopala, supra note 4. 
 102. ORPHAN WORKS DATABASE, https://perma.cc/ZNJ7-DWQX (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
 103. Orphan Works Register, GOV.UK, https://perma.cc/BJF2-RZTB (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
 104. Caroli et al., supra note 78.  
 105. Id. 
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and Their Copyright Holders”) registry.106   Whatever success they have had is 
difficult to measure however, and the number of entries in all orphan works databases 
combined is a barely perceptible fraction of the estimates of the total number of 
orphan works. 
Other proposals include “intent to use” registries,107 in which people intending to 
use works believed to be orphaned register in a central database accessible by 
owners.108   This might be effective to demonstrate the availability of equitable 
defenses, like laches, or as a step in due diligence to obtain a compulsory license.109  
Whichever of these approaches is considered more desirable, automation and search 
diligence auditability of such a registry are critical innovations the  technical platform 
we propose would provide.  If processes of diligent search can be automated, then 
there can also be automated population of an orphan work registry for the purpose of 
subsequent administrative verification, use-notification, or even non-exclusive 
compulsory licenses.  Indeed, with the amount of content produced daily with 
insufficient metadata to facilitate identification of copyright status, it seems 
unfathomable that a centrally administered database, especially one managed by 
human functionaries, could achieve useful scale.  For those reasons, we propose a 
technical registry infrastructure that is automated and decentralized, which would be 
populated by users of the system rather than a central administrative body. 
The orphan works blockchain platform we propose would operate as a distributed 
ledger that collects and records every time a search for the owner of a work is 
completed.  An orphan works search database of this sort would perform a range of 
functions.  First, it could facilitate auditing of search diligence.  A permanent, 
dynamic, continually updated record of relevant searches for the author of a work 
would be associated with an entry on a register, either through a link to the content 
itself or through identifying metadata sufficient to create a unique entry for each 
orphan work or work in the public domain.  As noted in the last section, this would 
be initially populated by a transparent diligent search expert system, or at least a 
 
 106. See Tim Padfield, Preserving and Accessing Our Cultural Heritage – Issues for Cultural Sector 
Institutions: Archives, Libraries, Museums and Galleries, in COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: 
PRESERVATION AND ACCESS TO WORKS IN A DIGITAL WORLD 195, 205 (Estelle Derclaye ed., Edward 
Elgar 2010). 
 107. A distributed registry, depending on how any orphan works solution were oriented, could 
function initially to broadcast an intention to obtain a licence or use right, thereby giving “notice” to the 
public, with automated development into a license after a designated period.  Brennan and Fraser, for 
example propose a regime involving “three sequential stages” of notice, including a “diligent user search 
and lodgement of a public notice, then after three months… a remedial limitation if the owner comes 
forward, then after three years . . . a compulsory licence administered by the declared collecting society.”  
See David Brennan & Michael Fraser, The Use of Subject Matter with Missing Owners – Australian 
Copyright Policy Options, 23(1) AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 4, 13 (2012).  A sophisticated approach to 
writing orphan works licenses as smart contracts could enable those stages to be fully automated without 
the need for a central collecting society as they propose. 
 108. See Duke Center for the Study of the Public Domain, Orphan Works Analysis and Proposal 
(Mar. 2005), https://perma.cc/P7M8-G6LG. 
 109. Joshua O. Mausner, Copyright Orphan Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful 
Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395, 416 (2007). 
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platform capable of recording searches conducted.  Depending on the legal model 
for orphan works use adopted, this register of searches could be employed by 
potential users to convince themselves of the diligence of existing searches for 
authors and avoid search duplication.  Alternatively, it could be used by an 
administrative body tasked with verifying the diligence of a search, as would be 
performed in the case of orphan works compulsory licensing.  As will be discussed 
below, with sufficiently sophisticated programming and the right legal definitions, 
this record of searches could similarly inform a technological system that a threshold 
of diligence has been reached.  Beyond a record of searches, the register could, in 
certain situations, operate as an authoritative register of intent to use.  In concert with 
relevant legal mechanisms, this could constructively fix copyright holders with 
notice of a potential orphanhood claim. 
Further, if the register were implemented in association with particular legal 
reform, it could adopt the character of a real property register under a Torrens 
system.110  Under this system of property interests, existing rights are not validated 
or perfected by the act of registration, but instead become vested through the very 
act of registration.  If this type of property system were implemented within the 
orphan work regime, the register itself would become part of the technological 
constellation that delivers works into orphanhood.  In other words, the distributed 
ledger would not register the right to use an orphan work, but rather grant the use 
right through the process of registration.111  In that way, the registry could vastly 
enhance the public domain by actively communicating a “public license to use” for 
certain works.  Torrens registration systems were implemented for real property in 
the early 19th century to avoid the difficulties of proving “good chain of title”—which 
is to say, determining the “true” property owner of property.112  It is not difficult to 
see the same system having utility in the context of the orphan works problem. 
Finally, the existence of an orphan works blockchain register would allow 
automatic licensing of orphan works through the coding and execution of 
compulsory “smart contracts” licences hosted on the register.  In that way, the status 
of a work could remain dynamic over time, with the conditions of use being 
controlled according to the legislative environment as well as user input.  
A blockchain registry of this sort could also be expanded beyond orphan works to 
include other lightly-permissioned works, such as a Creative Commons “attribution 
only” work,113 or for other permissionless uses, such as out-of-commerce works.  
Smart public licenses could therefore interact with in-copyright registries to automate 
movement between registries when copyright material falls out of term, or is deeded 
 
 110. See, e.g., R.G. Patton, The Torrens System of Land Registration, 19 MINN. L. REV. 519, 519 
(1935). 
 111. Frazer v. Walker (1967) 1 AC 569, which outlines the significance of registration of real 
property under a Torrens regime. 
 112. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 
J. LEG. STUD. 299 (1983). 
 113. See generally Creative Commons, About the Licenses:  What Our Licenses Do, 
https://perma.cc/X8SZ-XP3R. 
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to the public domain.114  It could also automate attribution mechanisms.115  This 
would remedy the situation, identified by a range of scholars that we do not have a 
mechanism to irreversibly dedicate a work to the public domain.116  These forms of 
disintermediation and automation of copyright management therefore offer potential 
for the type of higher level structural copyright reform sought for and theorized about 
for decades. 
C. TECHNO-LEGAL SOLUTIONS 
Our proposal is not the only technologically-mediated approach to the orphan 
works problem.  However it is the only one which is extensible and has a range of 
advantages over other approaches.  It includes commercial purposes, allows an 
automated distributed registry where “smart licenses” can transact rights over orphan 
works and lightly-permissioned works, and can disintermediate the equivalent of a 
centralized copyright licensing function into a technical system. 
There are a range of other possibilities that emerge from implementing this type 
of technology.  Notably, it can be used to provide for automated escrow, where a 
potential user could pay a license fee in case a rights holder does emerge. 117  
Although there are arguments that use of orphan works should not be predicated on 
any license fee at all, a blockchain system could accommodate such payment into 
escrow, in the form of smart contracts or smart trusts that can facilitate a market 
clearing mechanism for orphan works.  Yet that question lies outside of the scope of 
this Article. 
With the technical architecture established, it is now time to discuss the necessary 
legal architectures to make the technical proposal possible. 
III. LEGAL ARCHITECTURES 
As the outline above demonstrates, technology alone cannot produce a feasible 
orphan works clearance system.  Legal reform is also necessary to produce a holistic 
approach for the liberation of orphan works.  In this Part, we explain how the 
 
 114. David Hansen, for instance, does acknowledge that it is often difficult to distinguish these 
categories, and public domain works are often treated as orphans.  HANSEN, supra note 74. at 11; See also 
Daniel J. Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright Formalities: Why We Should 
Prioritize Recordation, and How to Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459, 1478 (2013) (discussing public 
domain deeding, specifically referring to Lessig’s model and the inversion of the idea that formalities must 
be a burden, wherein Lessig argues that a registry could encourage willing creators to dedicate their works 
to the public domain before the copyright in those works expired). 
 115.  Some have proposed coding those licenses to provide usage data back to authors as a form of 
gratitude.  See Lance Koonce, Please Share with Gratitude: How Blockchain Technology Can “Light up 
the Commons,” LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/7FZK-3AHP. 
 116.  Gervais & Renaud, supra note 114, at 1494. 
 117. Some have argued that such a fee should be equivalent to a properly negotiated licensing fee 
for the use of a work as if the owner had been located.  See Darrin Keith Henning, Copyright’s Deus Ex 
Machina: Reverse Registration as Economic Fostering of Orphan Works, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
201, 218 (2008). 
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technological platform described above might be complemented by, or incorporated 
within, certain proposals for orphan works legal reform.  We are generally agnostic 
to the form that such legal amendment might take.  However, the technological 
system we propose engages more successfully with certain reform options than 
others.  Accordingly, various orphan works reform proposals, and how they might 
interact with an automated diligent search and blockchain based registry, are 
discussed below. 
A. NON ORPHAN-WORKS-SPECIFIC COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS  
Before looking at orphan works specific approaches, it is worth briefly discussing 
certain existing legal mechanisms with applicability to orphan works and how they 
might be augmented or undermined by the technological system described above.  
Although these do not necessarily provide the structural changes necessary to address 
copyright’s shortcomings, they should not be underestimated.  To date, there are no 
examples of a cultural institution being found guilty of copyright infringement 
through use of orphan works.118  That is, however, also largely due to risk averse 
copyright management strategies.119  David Hansen has produced an impressive 
analysis of how these various existing mechanisms assist strategic use of orphan 
works by libraries and cultural institutions.120  However, many of these strategies are 
limited in their applicability to particular users and uses, and therefore do not afford 
the structural adjustments necessary to incentivise public use of the system we have 
outlined.  Nevertheless, the analysis still exposes certain benefits to the 
technologically-driven approach.  
The equitable doctrine of laches limits recourse for those that have “slept on their 
rights,” and is one example of an existing legal mechanism with potential utility for 
orphans.  Any use of an orphan work increases in legitimacy if the owner can be 
made aware, or constructively aware, of the use, and yet takes no action to intervene.  
A blockchain register producing public notification of such use could participate in 
 
 118. HANSEN, supra note 74, at 2; id. at 18 (discussing how in the U.S., there are only 8 judicial 
opinions using the term “orphan works,” and only two cases that directly address questions around orphans 
(The Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); The Authors Guild Inc., v 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014))). 
 119. See generally Hirtle, supra note 49, especially Chapter 10. 
 120.  See generally HANSEN, supra note 74; for example, Hansen discusses the application of 17 
U.S.C. § 108 (1976) to orphan works.  Id. at 33-42.  However, he notes these sections permit only single 
copy duplication, not systematic reproduction and derivative use, id. at 5, which are the goals of the 
system.  “Take down” policies are also a relatively useful mechanism for dealing with rights holders 
emerging after a subsequent use.  See David Hansen, Kathryn Hashimoto, Gwen Hinze, Pamela 
Samuelson & Jennifer M. Urban, Solving the Orphan Works Problem in the United States, 37 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 1, 41 (2013).  They become more problematic when the orphan work has been incorporated 
in a derivative or transformative use, as taking down the orphan work will ultimately eliminate the capacity 
to exhibit the complimentary creative work that has occurred on the back of the orphan work.  
Accordingly, for the sake of certainty, it is better to avoid any contingency dependent on the emergence 
of a rights holder.  Once a work is deemed orphaned, there should be a license permitting use of that work 
for whatever purposes, without risk that such a use might eventually be challenged.  
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producing constructive notice to be fixed on a copyright owner.  Copyright 
legislation already specifies that acts of recordation with the Copyright Office may 
result in constructive notice of the contents of those documents.121 
Fair use is another tool for orphan works users and mass digitizers.122  However, 
fair use sits uneasily with the requirements for orphan works clearances.  In 
particular, the focus on market usurpation in a fair use analysis is problematic when 
considering works for which there is no market and where there is no information 
about whether the creator wishes them to be available for market exchange.123  A 
blockchain register would assist in demonstrating the absence of commercial 
competition between the original rights holder’s market and that of a subsequent 
user.124  Additionally, the contours of what is “fair” may not achieve a sufficiently 
useful result.  For instance, the fair use justification of the Google Books court, and 
the snippets that decision affords users, are hardly what would have been available 
under a successful Google Books settlement. 125 
B. STRUCTURAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 
There have been general proposals for copyright law reform that could ameliorate 
orphan works issues.  The approaches below typically involve substantial adjustment 
to copyright law, to ensure copyright rules “serve policy objectives in the digital 
 
 121.  17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (2010). 
 122.  See Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage 
Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431 (2012); Megan L. Bibb, Note, Applying Old Theories to New 
Problems: How Adverse Possession Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Crisis, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 149 (2009); Aryeh L. Pomerantz, Obtaining Copyright Licenses by Prescriptive Easement: A Solution 
to the Orphan Works Problem, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2010); Jennifer Urban, How Fair Use Can Help 
Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012); Matthew W. Turetzky, Applying 
Copyright Abandonment in the Digital Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. [i] (2010); HANSEN, supra note 
74, at 18-25; William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004).  See also Response from the Library Copyright Alliance to the Copyright 
Office’s Orphan Works Report (June 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/3HV2-B6NL (responding to criticism of 
the fair use approach to orphan works); Stanford University Library, Comments on Orphan Works & Mass 
Digitization Report (Oct. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/GUL4-YJB4 (recognizing importance of fair use 
rationale for orphan works’ uses, but advocating for a further legislative solution to supplement fair use); 
HANSEN, supra note 74, at 19 (arguing fair use is probably itself the best solution to the orphan works 
problem); AUSTL. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, Intellectual Property Arrangements 193-97 (2016) 
(suggesting orphans, as well as out-of-commerce works, might be addressed by reforming the existing 
fair-dealing copyright exceptions into less purpose specific fair use exceptions). 




 124. Peter Groves, There’s Nothing New Around the Sun: Everything You Think of Has Been Done, 
18(4) ENT. L.R. 150 (2007). 
 125. See generally Thomas E. Wilhelm, Google Book Search:  Fair Use or Fairly Useful 
Infringement, 33 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 107 (2006); Jonathan Band, Google and Fair Use, 3 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2008). 
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age.”126  These include adjustments to term length,127 the possibility of renewal,128 
and mandatory recordage. 129   While potentially useful, these approaches often 
contradict international obligations under the Berne Convention and TRIPS 
agreements, and are, as a result, dead-on-arrival.130  However, blockchain registry 
technologies might allow for the practical reintroduction of registration incentives, 
and thereby “reformalize” copyright. 
It is beyond dispute that the abolition of formalities in copyright law was a primary 
cause of the orphan works problem.  Although “formalities” are not deterministically 
defined, they include the administrative obligations necessary for a copyright to exist 
and for the right to continue or remain practically available.131  As those formal 
requirements for obtaining copyright protection were abolished, copyright 
transformed from an “opt-in” to an “opt out” system, where all works became 
immediately subject to copyright protection as soon as they were expressed in a 
tangible medium.132  As described in the dissenting judgment of Justice Black in 
Washingtonian Publication Co. v. Pearson, formalities like registration and deposit 
with the copyright office were “intended to record publicly full and complete 
information about a work for which copyright is claimed and to make that work 
 
 126. Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1415, 
1419 (2013) (stating that to “serve the policy objectives of the digital age . . . we must remake the law”). 
 127. For instance, Posner and Landes argue for indefinitely renewable copyright, offering 
compelling economic rationales for a reduced initial mandatory copyright term coupled with shorter but 
indefinitely renewable subsequent opt-in terms.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely 
Renewable Copyright, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).  Posner and Landes also stress that a failure to opt-
in via registration would thus place the copyrighted material in the public domain, affording a useful 
mechanism for “filtering” commercially valuable copyright materials into ultimately achieving protection.  
Id.  However, this approach would unquestionably violate the Berne Convention, as would, arguably, even 
less radical legislative proposals, such as the Public Domain Enhancement Act, 2408 H.R (2006), that 
would have, without a mandatory shortening of the copyright term, introduced renewal requirements for 
retaining the final twenty years of copyright protection as a mode of demonstrating maintained commercial 
interest in a work.  See also Sanjiv D. Sarwate, Rescuing Orphan Works: An Analysis of Current 
Legislation, 26 IPL NEWS 21, 22 (2008) (citing a study by the Congressional Research Service, which 
found that for works older than fifty-five years, only two percent continued to generate revenues for 
owners.  Therefore, “[t]he remaining 98 percent with (presumably) no commercial value to the copyright 
owners remain under copyright, discouraging their use by others, even when that use might have a public 
benefit”). 
 128. Pallante, supra note 126, at 1419. 
 129. Id. at 1421. 
 130. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(2), July 24, 1971, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 131. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 541 (2004).  See also 
SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 323-
25 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1987); WIPO defines formalities as “any conditions or measures–
independent from those that relate to the creation of the work (such as the substantive condition that a 
production must be original in order to qualify as a protected work) or the fixation thereof (where it is a 
condition under national law) – without the fulfilment of which the work is not protected or loses 
protection. Registration, deposit of the original or a copy, and the indication of a notice are the most typical 
examples.”  World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties 
Administered by WIPO and Glossary of Copyright and Related Rights Terms 41 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/AG2M-F9AS. 
 132.  Note that this truly happened in the U.S. only after the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (1976).  
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continuously available for public inspection in order that the extent and boundaries 
of the monopoly may be understood by the public at all times during the life of the 
copyright.”133 
The significance of loosening formalities to the proliferation of orphan works is 
clear.  Sprigman describes how formalities filtered works for which the creator 
sought copyright protection, and those for which copyright protection was not 
intended.  Formalities also signalled the copyright status of a work to the public, 
providing relevant information to facilitate licensing and subsequent use.  As a result, 
of course, they provided the basis for saying whether a work was in the public 
domain.134  Removing the signal function has thus led to increased transaction costs 
for any subsequent use.135   Removing the filter, however, means works attract 
copyright protection irrespective of whether such protection is useful or expressly 
sought, and accordingly imposes restrictions on what uses can be made of the works.  
As noted by van Gompel, one significant effect of the filter function was to enlarge 
the public domain.136 
There has been substantial discussion around the reasons for and consequences of 
the abolition of formalities,137 and a significant academic literature proposes ways in 
 
 133. Washington Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 48-9 (1939). 
 134. Sprigman, supra note 131, at 500-02.  For example, registration (to obtain copyright protection) 
and recordage (during the term of protection) express that a work is copyright protected, the conditions 
by which you may copy, publish, perform, produce transformative material, and the party with agency to 
negotiate that use.  Id. at 500.  They would also indicate when works move from private ownership into 
the public domain.  Id. at 501.  The absence of such data diminishes the publicly available information 
about ownership and protection status of works to the extent that obtaining the necessary information 
becomes economically unviable.  Id. at 497.  “Filter” formalities, on the other hand, separate work for 
which the creator actually sought the protection of copyright.  Id. at 502.  That is, an author generally 
suffered the expense of complying with formalities on the basis of some scope for commercial exploitation 
of a work.  With this small obstacle to commercial copyright exploitation, many works of cultural value 
were effectively born immediately into the public domain.  Id. at 502.  The abolition of formalities 
interrupted this dynamic.  Id. at 502. 
 135. Daniel Gervais and Daniel Renaud have argued that the “formality-free copyright subjects all 
works to protection, not simply those that the Creative Clause seeks to encourage, creating a situation 
where routine activity may lead to the creation of copyrighted works (e.g. common business email) and 
to copyright infringement (copying of that email), and where copyright may even be exploited as a tool of 
censorship (e.g., by enjoining the posting of the email).”  Gervais & Renaud, supra note 114, at 1475. 
 136. “If the law would require authors and rights owners to supply adequate identifying information 
(e.g., in a public record or on the copies of their works) and to keep this information up-to-date, then users 
and third parties would be able, by inquiry, [sic] find the relevant copyright owners to arrange permission, 
if needed.  Furthermore, it would be easier to calculate the term of protection of works if reliable 
information about the author were available (given that, in most countries, this term is ordinarily calculated 
from the date of death of the author).  Enhancing the free flow of information by enlarging the public 
domain is an objective of an entirely different kind.  The main goal is to ensure that works that do not 
merit copyright protection – at least not for the full term of protection – fall into the public domain and 
are easily recognisable as being unprotected, so as to allow anyone to freely use or build upon them.”  Stef 
van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or Facilitators of Licensing, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1425, 1432 (2013). 
 137. Sprigman, supra note 131, at 544 (discussing how the overarching principle of the Berne 
Convention was to provide protection to authors whose work would be published in multiple countries by 
removing the requirements of complying with mandatory formalities in every jurisdiction of publication); 
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which pseudo-formalities could be re-introduced in order to overcome the market 
failures generated by the absence of formalities.138  Most authors exploring the 
reformalization of copyright focus on reintroducing “signal” style formalities in 
order to facilitate commercial licensing of in-copyright works,139 rather than as a way 
of enhancing the public domain.140  Van Gompel suggests that an enlargement of the 
public domain would require “constitutive or maintenance formalities,” which are 
incompatible with the Berne Convention.141  Alternatively, our proposal generates 
an enlargement of the public domain through the registry function, avoiding any 
challenge to international obligations.  
An orphan works registry like the one we propose imposes no registration 
requirement on copyright owners.  The data registered on the orphan works 
blockchain is a record of the searches undertaken to locate the owner of a work, and 
is thus better described as system measuring the appropriateness of a permission-free 
use, rather than a system requiring authors to register copyright.  It is therefore a 
forum through which efforts to locate a rights holder are recorded.  Its primary legal 
significance bears on the question of the diligence of a search for an owner, not the 
subsistence of copyright.  Its secondary legal significance relates to the satisfaction 
of an orphan works exception or licensing mechanism, but this does not necessarily 
require copyright owners to register to avoid their works being deemed orphaned.  
The register is therefore merely a forum for the use of certain works, not for copyright 
subsistence or ownership.  Whether the forum communicates, or indeed defines, 
copyright status would depend on the legal architecture behind the system.  
Accordingly, we cannot see how such a registry, even one that participated in the 
granting of a use right, would contravene international obligations. 
Nevertheless, such an approach still requires legal reform to vindicate any right 
to use a work.  As noted, we are not prescriptive to the contours of any particular 
orphan works regime.  However, the proposed technical architecture does strike us 
as more amenable to certain legal mechanisms than others.  Further, we believe 
 
Gervais & Renaud, supra note 114, at 1462-64 (arguing that the abolition of formalities was a triumph of 
a “natural rights” justification of copyright over its prior, more utilitarian, inclinations). 
 138. See generally Dennis W. K. Khong, Orphan Works, Abandonware and the Missing Market for 
Copyrighted Goods, 15 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 54, (2007); Joshua O. Mausner, Copyright Orphan 
Works: A Multi-Pronged Solution to Solve a Harmful Market Inefficiency, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 395 
(2007). 
 139. Van Gompel’s approach includes requiring compliance with formalities at a later point in time 
than the point of obtaining copyright protection, “thus requiring rights owners to take affirmative steps to 
prevent their works from passing into the public domain.”  These “new-style” formalities include 
requirements like metadata tagging of digital works, storage of rights management information in digital 
depositories, or any other digital tool that creates a link between rights owners and their works.  There are 
other similar proposals, for instance Lawrence Lessig’s idea that owners be required to place their works 
in a copyright registry or be subject to a compulsory default license with low royalty rates, and Sprigman’s 
proposal for introducing nominally voluntary but de facto mandatory formalities like registration, notice, 
and recordation, where non-compliance results in an irrevocable “default license” with low royalties.  
Sprigman, supra note 131, at 555. 
 140. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 114, at 1486. 
 141. Van Gompel, supra note 136, at 1440. 
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certainty of the technical architectures is important for users.  As a result, in the 
section that follows, we propose that the legal architecture underlying a blockchain 
solution should be one of existing ex ante approaches. 
C. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR ORPHAN WORKS  
1. Limited Liability 
Limited liability is an ex post solution for orphan works, where injunctive relief 
is restricted, and liability is limited to a license fee if an adequate diligent search is 
performed before the use.  In the case of a dispute, a court is generally tasked with 
verifying the diligence of a search, or setting a license fee in the form of damages.142  
If this is the preferred legal architecture, a blockchain orphan works search registry 
would have substantial evidential utility to deal with the imposition of liability in the 
event of a dispute.  The diligence of a search is made much easier by a canonical 
register of searches, allowing the parties as well as the judge or jury to assess the 
nature of the search.  
In our opinion, however, having the use of an orphan work vindicated only after 
judicial verification of the quality of search—that is, an ex post approach—fails to 
afford the certainty necessary for commercial uses.  Similarly, pursuing litigation 
becomes a transaction cost that is likely to be higher than the available remuneration 
for licensing.143  Using a blockchain orphan works registry exclusively for evidential 
purposes in case of a dispute also fails to take advantage of some of the more 
sophisticated possibilities afforded by the technology.  Limited liability approaches 
also offer reduced oversight of search diligence, at least until litigation.  Burdening 
the courts this way not only involves substantial administrative costs, but also leaves 
the vast majority of uses—and therefore diligent searches—unverified, and means 
that the definition of orphanhood will remain blurry and ad hoc.  In other words, the 
definition of an orphan becomes problematically softened when left to self-
regulation.  The value of an automated system and registry is that administrative 
functions can be finalized prior to litigation, providing certainty.  This will result in 
substantial administrative savings that, in the case of limited liability approaches, 
would otherwise have to be absorbed by the courts. 
 
 142. See David B. Sherman, Cost and Resource Allocation Under the Orphan Works Act of 2006: 
Would the Act Reduce Transactions Costs, Allocate Orphan Works Efficiently, and Serve the Goals of 
Copyright Law?, 12 VA. J.L. TECH 4, 1 (2007).  Monetary relief is generally limited to “reasonable 
compensation,” and there is generally no possibility of statutory damages, attorney’s fees, or injunctive 
relief unless the search for rightsholder was done in bad faith. 
 143. See Darrin, Keith & Henning, supra note 117, at 212; see also Ryan Andrews, Contracting Out 
of the Orphan Works Problem: How the Goggle Book Search Settlement Serves as a Private Solution to 
the Orphan Works Problem and Why It Should Matter to Policy Makers, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 97, 
113 (2009). 
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2. Copyright Exceptions  
An alternative approach to limiting user liability is to allow specific orphan work 
use through copyright exceptions.  Ordinarily these require a good faith diligent 
search to be performed and verified by a bureaucratic body.  The European Orphan 
Works Directive affords one example of what such an exception would facilitate.144  
However, that exception is narrowly framed, and is applicable only for cultural 
institutions and for non-commercial purposes.145  It has been suggested that allowing 
commercial uses of orphan works might create “a loophole for bad actors to exploit, 
without any benefit to visual arts creators and owners in terms of increased 
licensing,” 146  and require significant expense in using private registries for 
protection.147  However, the US Copyright Office’s 2015 report on orphan works 
argued that the distinction between commercial and non-commercial uses cannot 
realistically be maintained. 148   More than this, any holistic approach needs to 
consider the orphan works problem as broader than issues around mass digitisation, 
and the political landscape appears to have already shifted accordingly.  Commercial 
uses of orphan works are as politically significant as cultural uses.  Today, a large 
amount of new content is the product of transformative use and is the source of 
substantial originality, yet “much of our cultural raw material is outside the reach of 
creators because of the orphan works problem.”149 
As discussed above, a blockchain based orphan works registry could afford 
evidential clarity for the diligence of any particular search, as in the case of limited 
liability systems.  However, unless the exception applies to commercial uses, there 
is unlikely to be sufficient incentive to populate the orphan works registry.  
Therefore, as part of our proposal, we would broadly support the extension of 
exceptions into the commercial arena. 
3. Statutory Compulsory Licensing 
Statutory compulsory licensing of copyright works has existed since the middle 
of the nineteenth century.150  It is generally understood as “plot[ting] a midway 
course between an exclusive right and a free exception.”151  The interference with 
 
 144. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 114. 
 145. Id. 
 146. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 64, at 52 (referring to Illustrators 
Partnership of America, Initial Comments Submitted in Response to Notice of Inquiry 77 Fed. Reg. 64555 
(Feb. 4, 2013) at 20 (“By defining millions of copyright works as orphans on the premise that some might 
be, previous bills would allow Internet content providers to build financial empires by harvesting the work 
of others, providing their databases with content they could never create themselves nor acquire from 
authors without having to pay for it.”)).  
 147. Id.   
 148. Id; Vuopala, supra note 4. 
 149. Brito & Dooling, supra note 50, at 76. 
 150. See David J. Brennan, First Compulsory Licensing of Patents and Copyright, 17 LEGAL HIST. 
1, 4 (2017). 
 151. Id. at 1. 
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property rights achieved by compulsory licensing is generally justified on the basis 
of avoiding copyright being used to prevent material reaching the public. 152  
Compulsory licensing for orphan works ordinarily involves administrative bodies 
verifying the quality of a diligent search that is performed by an applicant.  A verified 
search, coupled with a determination on appropriate license fee typically results in a 
non-exclusive license for use.  Fees are generally held in escrow for an established 
period of time in case the rights holder emerges.  
The need to satisfy the public has resulted in numerous compulsory licenses of 
varied efficacy and utility.  In 1866, the United Kingdom implemented the first 
license of this kind anywhere in the world,153 although it was repealed 70 years later 
without a single application. 154   This historical example of underuse is not an 
anomaly:  the vast majority of compulsory copyright licenses in every jurisdiction 
have been underused—a fact that continues to this day—and compulsory licenses for 
orphan works are barely, if ever, applied for.  For example, compulsory licensing for 
orphan works has been in place in Canada since 1988,155 and is now in Japan, Korea, 
Hungary and the UK.156  All of these systems are notoriously underused.  The 
Canadian Copyright Board administers licenses when “the Board is satisfied that the 
applicant has made reasonable efforts to locate the owner of the copyright and that 
the owner cannot be located.”157  An analysis of that licensing regime offered dreary 
 
 152. David Brennan cites a first reading speech from a UK 1910 Bill that nicely summarizes the 
rationale.  “But in order that the public may be protected from any possible abuse, the Bill will provide 
that after the death of the author, if the work is withheld from the public, or too high a price is charged for 
copies or for the right to perform, so that the reasonable requirements of the public are not satisfied, a 
licen[s]e may be granted to an applicant to publish or perform the work.”  19 Parl Deb HC (1910) col. 
1949 (UK).  See Brennan, supra note 150, at 24. 
 153. Brennan, supra note 150, at 8. 
 154. Id. at 10.  The first, proposed in 1837, and addressing concerns that extended copyright terms 
post mortem, permitted compulsory reprints for out of commerce literary works, although only after a 
notice had been given to the rights holder.  Brennan, supra note 150, at 14.  Brennan identifies how the 
political rhetoric in support of the license deployed fears that pirates would inevitably produce infringing 
copies of non-available texts if the ability to control publication was passed on to heirs, Brennan, supra 
note 150, at 14.  The result was a compulsory license available during the post-mortem copyright term, 
with jurisdiction vested in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to prevent the suppression of 
important books.  Other rationales in the United Kingdom for compulsory licensing identified by Brennan 
include addressing unauthorized importation in colonial jurisdictions (like the U.S.) of foreign reprints by 
(very unsuccessfully) introducing a importation customs duty to be paid to authors.  Id. at 17-18.  When a 
similar regime was proposed and rejected in Canada in 1872, a British Royal Commission even explored 
the possibility of a generalized system of compulsory licensing (a “royalty” system) as a possibility of 
replacing the exclusive “proprietary” rights associated with copyright. Id at 18.  Different levels of 
government have also endured the jurisdiction of administering compulsory licenses, including (in the 
U.K.) Office of the Lord Chancellor, the Privy Council, specific “Trade Boards,” and the comptroller of 
patents, designs and trademarks. 
 155. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.).  
 156. See Chosakuken-Ho [Copyright Law], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 67, 74 (Jap.); see also 
Copyright Act of Korea, No. 9785 (2009) (S. Kor.); Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 13 at para. 
17, Acts of Parliament, 2012 (India), available at https://perma.cc/52YT-HZ9S; Copyright Designs and 
Patent Act 1988, c 48 s. 116A (Eng.). 
 157. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.).  
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results,158 with only 230 licenses granted in a twenty-year period.  The results suggest 
centralized compulsory licensing, administered by an entity like the Canadian 
Copyright Board, tasked with verification of the quality and diligence of searchers 
for copyright owners, is thus unlikely to achieve substantial liberation of orphans. 
It seems that the bureaucratic cost of centralized compulsory licensing renders it 
relatively ineffective.  Requiring a potential licensee to first undertake a diligent 
search, and then to have the quality of that search verified by a central agency, is 
duplication of expensive work.159  Of course, the licensing body itself also needs to 
be established and administered.160  Further, intervening against the market with 
centrally determined licensing fees has always been a controversial dimension of 
compulsory licensing.  For instance, the US Copyright Office rejected this approach 
on the basis that it considered a government agency determining a licensing fee rather 
than private parties participating in the market as inappropriate.161  
Antithetically, there are arguments that compulsory licensing with fixed prices is 
more efficient than relying on parties to negotiate prices, because “if buyers could 
determine the licensing fee ex ante, they would be more willing to expend the search 
effort.”162  There are also persuasive arguments as to whether licensing fees for 
orphan works should be paid at all.  Some argue that paying royalties even when an 
owner remains missing might constitute a disincentive for such a system.163  There 
is also the issue that users must pay a fee even if no identifiable owner subsequently 
comes forward.  Further, a number of scholars suggest that compulsory licensing is 
problematic because it only addresses owners’ economic concerns, not their desire 
to preserve the integrity of their work or their own reputation.164  That said, there are 
few commercial orphan works proposals that do not affect the capacity of owners to 
maintain total control over use and distribution of works.  Additionally, licensing 
fees may make commercial uses of orphan works more palatable.  
Irrespective of any position taken on the pricing issue, the technical architecture 
for a blockchain register that we propose could address both the controversy around 
use of licensing fees, as well as the bureaucratic expense of compulsory licensing.  
With respect to licensing fees, smart contracts on a blockchain could operate as an 
 
 158. Jeremy De Beer & Mario Bouchard, Canada’s ‘Orphan Works’ Regime: Unlocatable 
Copyright Owners and the Copyright Board, 10 OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 215, 243, (2010). 
 159. Hansen et al., supra note 76, at 41. 
 160. Id. at 42.  “By way of illustration of these significant costs, the UK Intellectual Property Office 
has estimated the costs of its new system as follows: The cost to users of conducting diligent searches for 
individual uses of orphan works would be E31 m to E122m p.a.; the cost of establishing the new 
authorizing body would be E2.5m (for establishing a registry or database of licensed orphan works) to 
£10 m (for establishing a new body with regulatory functions that could determine whether suspected 
orphan works could be used under license); and the costs of operating the new authorizing body would be 
£0.5m to £l.8m p.a..” 
 161. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITALIZATION, supra note 64, at 94-97. 
 162. Hal R. Varian, Copyright Term Extension and Orphan Works, 15 INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE 
965, 972 (2006). 
 163. Brennan & Fraser, supra note 107, at 13.  
 164. Marc H. Greenberg, Reason or Madness. A Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains, 7 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13 (2007). 
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escrow, with a licensing fee paid into the contract to be distributed to an owner if 
they subsequently come forward.  Alternatively, a smart contract implementation 
could automatically return the licensing fee to the licensee after a specified amount 
of time. 
With respect to the administrative cost of verification, the expert system which 
we propose could include a threshold of search diligence that would produce an 
automated definition that a work is orphaned.  This would mean that the verification 
of diligence, which is the general precondition of a compulsory license, would be 
performed by the technical infrastructure of the system, not by a government body, 
functionary, or CMO.  This would create a disintermediated and automated 
verification of a diligent search by a technical architecture.  Guidance on the specific 
databases and repositories that must be searched for in order for a search to be 
deemed diligent are already provided in certain jurisdictions and there are various 
regulatory and legislative approaches to outlining what is required for such a 
search.165  Defining orphanhood through an automated mechanism would require 
legal reform giving significance to that exercise in automated decision making.  
However, the blockchain infrastructure could then adopt greater legal significance, 
as the act of registration would vest the use right in the public, and deliver a work 
into orphanhood, and potentially into the public domain.  This would overcome the 
administrative expense of traditional compulsory licensing using an automated and 
transparent technical system. 
4. Voluntary and Mandatory Extended Collective Licensing 
Extended collective licensing, a Nordic concept,166 was part of the latest orphan 
works proposal from the US Copyright Office.167  Under “voluntary” collective 
licensing, owners register their works with a CMO, who subsequently licenses use 
of the work for a pre-determined fee, and distributes royalties accordingly.  This 
saves the user from having to find and negotiate with the owner directly.  CMOs are 
generally specific to a genre of work:  for example, in the US, the Harry Fox Agency 
 
 165. Under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, 6, c. 24 (Eng.), the U.K. government 
has powers to enable licensing of orphan works in the UK for commercial and noncommercial use.  The 
licensing scheme has been implemented through The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing 
of Orphan Works) Regulations, 2014, No. 2863 s. 4 (Eng.), which states that a diligent search must 
comprise a reasonable search of the relevant sources to identify and locate the right holder.  The relevant 
sources under 4(3) of the Regulations that must be consulted for all diligent searches are:  The orphan 
works register for the UK licensing scheme, The OHIM orphan works database, and the appropriate 
sources under Part 2 of Schedule ZA1 of the Copyright Designs and Patent Act, 1988, c .48 (Eng.).  This 
guidance for potential applicants is provided for under 4(4) of the Regulations and provides an aid to 
conducting a diligent search.  It explains what is involved in a diligent search and what to consider in 
advance.  The guidance includes details on the relevant sources that applicants must consult, provides a 
non-exhaustive list of additional sources, and explains how an applicant must submit their evidence to the 
authorizing body which is the UK Intellectual Property Office (“IPO”). 
 166. Terese Foged, Licensing Schemes in an On-Demand World, 32 EIPR 20, 21 (2010).  See also 
Hansen White Paper, supra note 76, at 46. 
 167. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITALIZATION, supra note 64, at 7. 
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is the largest CMO for licensing “mechanicals,” which are licenses to rights in 
musical compositions for uses like covers or ringtones.  Similarly, ASCAP, BMI and 
SESAC license public performance of sound recordings.  CMOs emerged as 
technological developments that made it difficult for individuals to monitor and 
enforce their own rights.168 
Extended collective licensing “extends” a CMO’s license administration regime 
to non-members.  Those non-members are content owners who have not voluntarily 
signed up with the CMO.  The scheme operates through the legal artifice of deeming 
all creators of a certain type of work under the purview of a CMO if a certain 
percentage of creators are members.  The critical mass of membership is taken to 
represent the likely intention of non-member creators.  According to the US 
Copyright Office, the rationale for extended collective licensing is the promotion of 
uses of content “that are considered socially beneficial but for which the costs of 
obtaining rights on an individual basis may be prohibitively high.”169  The primary 
difference from compulsory licensing is that royalty negotiation is performed by the 
CMO ostensibly on behalf of its members, rather than by a government or other 
centralized body.170 
The potential for extended collective licensing to assist with orphan works is clear.  
Users can obtain licenses for works of a particular type from a CMO without having 
to search for a rights holder, and the license terms negotiated between rightsholders 
and the CMOs are “extended” to rightsholders of the same class, overcoming issues 
of governments setting royalty fees.  When orphan works are licensed, the CMO 
spends a percentage of the licensing fee searching for the rights holder and pays itself 
a certain amount for administration.  Like limited liability approaches, the 
definitional quality of a verified diligent search is abrogated in favor of faith in a 
private operator to act appropriately under the auspices of a statutory prescription.  
Claims to remuneration by a rights holder that subsequently emerges are therefore 
against the CMO, not the user. 
Criticisms of extended collective licensing include the removal of economic 
imperatives to actively connect owners and users, and therefore expose license 
negotiations to free market conditions, as absent rights holders become bound by 
statute.171  This upends traditional copyright principles because it applies to works 
and rights holders other than orphans.  That is, it introduces permissionless licensing 
in situations where content owners are perfectly willing, ready and available to 
negotiate licenses.  It also creates situations where rights holders have not agreed to 
be represented by the CMO.  Extended collective licensing also operates in narrow 
domains prescribed by statute,172 thus failing to produce a universal approach to 
 
 168. Jeremy Thorpe, Collective Licensing of Copyright: Options For Competitive Reform, 5  
AGENDA 213, (1998). 
 169. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITALIZATION, supra note 64. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., HANSEN, supra note 74, at 76. 
 172. In Denmark, where extended collective licensing is most prevalent, there are eight areas in 
which CMOs can grant licenses for the material of non-members:  reproduction for educational use, 
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orphan works clearance.  Similarly, such licenses may also be limited to particular 
types of institutions173 for particular purposes rather than universal applications.  
Further, where they are successful, they risk producing monopolies for CMOs.174 
Because a CMO must already represent a critical mass of owners of a particular 
class, extending a CMO’s right to license where “voluntary” collective licensing is 
not already developed becomes a more radical idea.175  Extended collective licensing 
has also been criticized on the basis that once a licensing fee has been paid to the 
CMO, the search for a true owner occurs under conditions of conflicted interest, as 
CMOs are often permitted to retain licensing fees if owners cannot be located.176  
There are now mechanisms to address that however, such as requirements around 
dispersal of escrowed funds to particular purposes rather than the CMO’s general 
coffers. 177   Nevertheless, this remains problematic in the context of private 
organizations being afforded monopolies over particular classes of work through 
 
reproduction of descriptive articles by business enterprises for internal use for the purpose of their 
activities, online transfer of texts via libraries, recording and distribution of radio and television 
programmes for visually handicapped persons, use of works in generally informative presentations, and 
radio and television broadcasts.  See Zijan Zhang, Transplantation of an Extended Collective Licenscing 
System – Lessons From Denmark, 47 INT’L. REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 640 (2016).  However, the 
Danish Ministry of Culture has stated that social and technological development proves a need for 
extended collective licensing in new areas of exploitation, including digitization and dissemination 
cultural heritage.  Foged, supra note 166, at 24. 
 173.  See Vuopala, supra note 4, at 47. 
 174.  For example, the Amended Google Books settlement would have instantiated, through 
litigation, a de facto CMO for books in the US in the form of a “books rights registry.”  It is estimated the 
Google Book Search project has scanned over seven million texts, approximately one million from the 
public domain, one million with permission from publishers and five million that were out of print.  
Andrews, supra note 143, at 118-19.  The “genius” of the Google Books litigation would have been its de 
facto change in the default copyright position from opt-in to opt-out.  See Randal C. Picker, The Google 
Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMP. L.& ECON. 383, 385 (2009).  This 
radical step was certainly part of its undoing, as was, as Judge Denny Chin described, its provision of a 
de facto monopoly to Google for orphan works.  The U.S. Copyright Office complained that Book Search 
amounted to a judicially instituted compulsory license, which should be the domain of the legislature.  The 
report argued that only the legislature should be entitled to grant compulsory licenses and only in 
circumstances of market failure.  The report further characterized the project as “an end-run round 
copyright law as we know it.”  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books, Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 68 (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright 
Office); see Pamela Samuelson, Legislative Alternatives to the Google Book Settlement, 34 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 697 (2011) (suggesting that the Google Books settlement agreement should not be approved).  
The district court ultimately rejected the negotiated settlement agreement, in part because of its treatment 
of orphan works.  See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  See also 
Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic Experience: It’s a Hybrid 
but Is It a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 474–76 (2010) (reviewing the Nordic ECL 
model on which the Copyright Office’s proposal is based). 
 175.  See, e.g., HANSEN, supra note 74, at 46. 
 176. Stef Van Gompel, The Orphan Works Chimera and how to Defeat It: A View from Across the 
Atlantic, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1347, 1363 (2012). 
 177. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014, 
S.I. 2588, art. 19 (U.K), available at https://perma.cc/65E5-LADR; Alain Strowel, The European 
Extended Collective Licensing Model, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 665 (2011). 
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statute.  It has not helped that there have been a number of examples of problematic 
behavior on the part of CMOs.178 
Extended collective licensing and the technical architecture we have outlined are 
essentially incompatible.  The automated platform, distributed registry and smart 
contracts effectively usurp the functions of a CMO.  The search performed by a CMO 
would have to be performed by a user rather than the CMO, although an effective 
expert system could ameliorate any direct expense.  Any pricing mechanism could 
be built into the blockchain with smart contracts functioning as escrow for rights 
holders, eliminating potential windfalls for private entities.  Any money not collected 
could be returned to searchers or otherwise used to promulgate the system, for 
instance, by paying for access to non-open access content repositories for the sake of 
searching.  And the corporate knowledge generated through administering rights 
would be made transparent on the registry. 
5. Multi-Tiered Solutions 
It is important to note that some jurisdictions deploy combinations of legal 
mechanisms to address different uses and users of orphan works.  A multi-tiered 
approach recognizes that the expense of diligent search and administrative 
verification would prevent mass digitisation by cultural institutions, 179  but not 
individual, small-scale or even commercial uses.180  Accordingly mass-digitization 
might be afforded an extended collective licensing tool, but other uses must still 
perform diligent search.  Further, cultural institutions might not require independent 
administrative verification of search diligence, whereas individuals still do. 181  
Multi-tiered approaches require difficult and slippery classifications of uses and 
users, including an impossible distinction between commercial and non-commercial.  
They also, in certain scenarios, withdraw the necessity of administratively verified 
diligence, 182  which obscures the definition and category of orphanhood.  If an 
 
 178. Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective 
Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 541, (2005). 
 179. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 74, at 10 (“Even if Congress does coalesce behind legislation, the 
leading proposal from the Copyright Office is unlikely to allow for large-scale open access to orphan 
works because of the administrative burdens digitizers would face in complying with search requirements 
and filing a “notice of use” for each work.”). 
 180. Sprigman, supra note 131, at 11. 
 181. See, e.g., Hansen White Paper, supra note 76, at 19 (“It was originally proposed that diligent 
searches for both tiers would be reviewed and confirmed by a new government body that would be tasked 
with authorizing use of orphan works.  After consultation with library and publisher stakeholders, the UK 
government has decided that the new authorizing body will not generally validate searches done by 
institutions or their agents in the first tier.  Instead, it will take a “regulatory” approach, accrediting 
institutions that want to register orphan works, and periodically testing the quality of institutions’ searches 
and the search process on a random sampling basis.”).  See also Van Gompel, supra note 176, at 1349. 
 182. The UK Intellectual Property Office estimates that the cost to users of conducting these diligent 
searches would be £31m-£122m per annum and the cost of operating the authorizing body would be 
£0.5m-£1.8m per annum.  U.K. INTELL. PROP. OFF., FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ON ORPHAN WORKS 6-
7 (June 2012), https://perma.cc/37CY-KCWL. 
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automated system and registry were sufficiently efficient, such differentiation would 
be unnecessary. 
6. Conclusion 
A technical infrastructure of expert systems, automated search and verification, 
smart contracts, and distributed ledgers could be the foundation for multiple legal 
architectures addressing orphan works.  Nevertheless, the technologies demonstrate 
particular affordances that benefit certain orphan works clearance constructs over 
others.  While many of these mechanisms involve a diligent search, which the 
proposed system would automate (or at least record the results of), the legal 
significance of a blockchain orphan works registry differ for each approach.  For 
instance, in limited liability regimes, the orphan works registry is effectively an 
evidentiary artifact, enabling auditing of search diligence.  For a copyright exception, 
a blockchain registry would be a suitable database technology.  However, an 
automated system could additionally perform some of the administrative verification 
of search diligence.  Registration of a work would both publicize that a certain work 
could be used under the copyright exception and provide a record of the search for 
owners.  Under a compulsory licensing regime, the technology would perform a 
similar function.  However, it could also support payment and escrow of a license 
fee.  That would mean registration of a work would vest a non-exclusive license in 
the applicant and accordingly deliver the work into orphanhood.  In the case of an 
extended collective licensing regime, the technology could effectively replicate the 
functions of a CMO under the artifice of extended jurisdiction to non-members but 
eliminate any profiteering by private entities for a socially useful copyright clearance 
mechanism. 
Also discussed above is the possibility of enabling the system to automate the 
definitions of diligence and orphanhood and the granting of use rights.  In other 
words, the requirements for diligence might not be prescribed in legislation or 
regulation to be replicated through an expert system, but rather, the legislation could 
specify that the search performed by the technical architecture constitutes a diligent 
search, giving a “legal” character to the code animating the system.  This approach 
rejects the relationship between diligent search and the definition of orphans in any 
ex post, or non-administratively verified system, for instance as proposed by the U.S. 
Copyright Office in 2006, which adopted: 
… a very general standard for reasonably diligent search that will have to be applied by 
users, copyright owners and ultimately the courts on a case-by case basis, accounting 
for all of the circumstances of the particular use.  Such a standard is needed because of 
the wide variety of works and uses identified as being potentially subject to the orphan 
works issues, from an untitled photograph to an old magazine advertisement to an out-
of-print novel to an antique postcard to an obsolete computer program.  Each of these 
presents different challenges in trying to find a copyright owner, and what is reasonable 
in one circumstance will be unreasonable in another.  It is not possible at this stage to 
craft a standard that can be specific to all or even many of these circumstances.  
Moreover, the resources, techniques and technologies used to investigate the status of 
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a work also differ among industry sectors and change over time, making it hard to 
specify the steps a user must take with any particularity.183  
An effective, universal, and legally significant system rejects the claim that “[i]t 
is not possible . . . to craft a standard that can be specific to all or even many of these 
circumstances.”  The approach in some European jurisdictions, including the use of 
comprehensive checklists and regulations expressing the character of a search that 
would subsequently be verified as adequate by an administering body, already 
suggests movement away from the generalist definition.  If diligent search is to be 
the definitional criterion of an orphan work, verification becomes a crucial element 
of the bureaucratic technology of that definition.  Indeed, the compulsory licensing 
model discussed above generally includes verification mechanisms that contributed 
to their inefficiency, resulting in some cases in a devolution of that process into mere 
administrative oversight and auditing.  However, a technical system might push these 
verification mechanisms out of administrative or bureaucratic entities and into the 
technical infrastructure itself. 
This would render the technological platform more than merely an exercise in “E-
Government” or a novel use of ICTs to “improve” public sector organizations.  It 
goes beyond merely facilitating transactions between publics and governing bodies.  
Rather, it represents the performance of specific administrative tasks by a 
technological system, including the automation of administrative and legal decision 
making and the vesting of legal rights with reduced human oversight. 
Our blockchain-based approach thus devolves an administrative process into an 
automated technological structure.  The blockchain is certainly not a technology 
specific to intellectual property, nor is it even simply an efficiency enhancing 
technological innovation.  Rather, as Potts, Davidson, and de Filippi argue, the true 
value of distributed ledger technology is as an institutional innovation, a technology 
of economic coordination and governance.184  It is precisely as a new institutional 
form and coordination mechanism that makes blockchain a useful technology for 
addressing orphan works.  It is the logic of coordination and consensus building 
associated with the blockchain that enables the verification, issuance and registration 
of licenses through an automated technical structure.  While automated 
administrative decision making and legal expert systems are nothing new, the 
blockchain architecture and the automation of registration raise novel questions 
related to the automation of legal processes. 
Trying to formulate an understanding of these institutional changes, even in a 
relatively peripheral area like orphan works, requires acknowledging a breakdown 
of the traditional distinction between technology and law.  Legal scholars must be 
alive to the questions of what it means to have a technical system that is written in a 
language that a lawyer may not understand but which produces legal definitions and 
legal actions.  Relocating institutional agency to the level of engineers and designers 
who produce the technologies would upend the traditional hierarchy of the law.  
 
 183. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 9 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 184. Potts et al., supra note 32. 
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Lawyers, bureaucrats, and administrators would no longer be the arbiters of legal 
process.  Instead, control would pass to engineers and designers.  The long term effect 
of this is not well-understood, and unpacking this problem is a topic for another day. 
However, we should be aware of what we are doing when we insert technology 
into the legal process.  Replacing an administrative body with a technical platform 
should only be done with an understanding of what it means to delegate legal 
decision making into pre-determined design parameters.  Such an approach will 
inevitably have consequences for transparency and autonomy.  In articulating and 
promoting an automated orphan works clearance system in this article, we are 
making the assessment that the technical system will on average produce outcomes 
of sufficient desirability to mollify any negative consequences associated with 
transformed institutional structures.  Nevertheless, we recognize that as a society we 
need to move towards these new forms of institutional governance and decision-
making with a clear understanding of the risks.  We cannot afford to be blinded by 
the shiny surface of our new technological playthings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite substantial effort, the orphan works problem has hardly disappeared.  This 
Article examines the possibility of using distributed ledgers, in combination with 
artificial intelligence techniques for automating diligent search, to further facilitate 
use of orphan and public domain works.  The system proposed here is intended to 
enhance existing “diligent search” expert systems by introducing a publicly available 
and auditable registry of all searches undertaken for a rights holder.  Addressing 
orphan works with registry-based solutions is not a new idea.185  However, the 
specific affordances associated with blockchain ledgers offers advantages not 
available in more traditional registry structures.  Whereas existing orphan works 
registries provide entries for works already deemed orphaned, the blockchain-based 
system we propose does not merely record administratively-verified orphan works 
for the purpose of avoiding search duplication, but rather becomes part of the 
mechanism that delivers a work into orphan status.  We have outlined a range of 
ways in which a blockchain-based register might become a part of the solution.  It 
might be through the simple mechanism of providing data to audit the diligence of a 
search or through a sophisticated mechanism where the registry itself generates a 
definition of “diligence.”  The blockchain solution might be enhanced by changes in 
the law that actively vest a public use right in an orphan work via a Torrens-style 
register.  In even more sophisticated mechanisms, an orphan work use right could be 
written as a “smart license” that executes certain functions over the orphan work.  
Whatever mechanism is selected, our primary claim is that the logics of coordination 
and consensus building associated with blockchain are highly useful for enabling the 
 
 185. Lessig has suggested introducing a system similar to registering internet domain names, the 
idea being that competition between competing registration systems leads to a race to the bottom regarding 
ease and cost of registration.  Lawrence Lessig, For the Love of Culture, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 26, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/5GSK-H6P8.  However, we think an established universal solution has more utility. 
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verification of diligent search, as well as the issuance and registration of an orphan 
works use right, with an automated technical system.  
The various options for technical architectures suggested above each require 
different legal architectures to make best use of the affordances of distributed ledger 
technology.  As noted, this might be as simple as an immutable register of searches 
that can be audited or as complex as using automated decision making systems to 
transfer rights.  With each approach, we argue above that the technology could 
overcome certain economic barriers to the performance and verification of diligent 
search, as well as communication to the public of the use of certain works.  We 
further believe that use of a public registry could provide a socially useful function 
without including any profiteering associated with private copyright management, as 
has been argued is a feature of CMOs.186 
The goal of this Article, therefore, is not to prescribe the specificities of any 
orphan works clearance mechanism.  Instead we have sought to outline the new 
technical architecture and legal infrastructures which might resolve the orphan works 
problem.  In doing so, we hope to contribute to the discussion of intellectual property 
registration by prompting next-generation solutions for liberating use of orphan 
works.  While our proposal is shaped around orphan works issues, there is also scope 
for extending the idea to the management of other categories of content such as out-
of-commerce works,187 light-permission works, or public domain works. 
Beyond copyright management, blockchain technologies are likely to play an 
increasingly prominent role in asset management and government services generally.  
For instance, real property registration has been a suggested use case for distributed 
ledgers from early in their development.188  Although some have criticized the use 
of blockchain approaches for government registration services because they often 
employ private or permissioned blockchains, we believe distributed ledgers do not 
need to have proof of work mechanisms and digital currencies to be desirable and 
useful.189  Private and permissioned ledgers are increasingly using other mechanisms 
for consensus and integrity.190  Further, the system we have suggested in not a private 
ledger available only to particular persons.  The search audit data recorded on the 
orphan works / public domain blockchain is only useful when it is fully public and 
available.  In certain respects, the registry element of the proposed system is a type 
of “open data” mechanism.  This is because the technology enhances the crucial 
dimensions of a government register, being verification, trust, and public availability. 
Accordingly, in the next few years, many government registration functions are 
likely to be disintermediated into technical platforms, with the automation of those 
 
 186. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Brandon Butler, Some Cautionary Tales About Collective Licensing, 
21(3) MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 689 (2013). 
 187. AUSTL. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/D39E-XJBH (suggesting that OOC and OW be treated similarly). 
 188. Staples M. et al., Risks and Opportunities for Systems Using Blockchain and Smart Contracts, 
DATA61 (CSIRO) (May 2017), https://perma.cc/F62V-BZBJ. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 18. 
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platforms offering distinct efficiencies over human bureaucratic administration.  Our 
proposal for orphan works is merely one of the many ways in which we see 
automated systems taking over legal processes.  In the future, we anticipate the 
institutional logic of blockchain as being highly influential on the changing 
mechanics of governance. 
